Criminology and Violence: Reflections on Elliott Currie’s *The Roots of Danger*

**The Criminology of Violence**

Imagine if you will, we wish to write a book about violence. We know do we not what violence is. So what we wish to examine in this book is the question ‘Why do people commit violent acts?’ Or, perhaps, if we are North American, ‘Why is North America peculiarly violent?’ Because we know do we not that this is true. Because we know what violence is we don’t have to be too critical in defining our terms; we could cite Oberwittler and Hoffer when they talk about “violent crimes that harm the physical integrity of the individual” (2005, p. 469). Or we may decide to follow Currie in saying as he does in his book on violence that he looks specifically at

“violent crime, rather than collective forms of violence, like civil wars or revolutions.” And he focusses “on the kinds of violent crime that take place on the streets and in the homes – not on violence committed by, say, governments or corporations – which can be terribly destructive in its own right, as well as criminal.” He also focuses “on serious violent crime: not on everyday fights in the schoolyard or shoving matches in the local bar, but on the kinds of violence that can cause great physical and emotional harm – murder, rape, serious assault, robbery” (pp. 6-7).

So we have, if not a definition of violence, a speci-fication for the kind of violence that is worthy of our attention. Or so it would appear. In fact, we have a speci-fication of the kind of violence that can be more reliably talked about.
Imagine further, now that we have specified the boundaries of violence, we can talk about its distribution and dimensions (pp. 8-33). It will be necessary for us to outline the problems with assessing the distribution and dimensions of violent crime, paying particular attention to contingencies in reporting and recording practices across jurisdictions and to the variations in the weight accorded by those doing the recording, to the reporting of the experiences of different ‘kinds’ of persons from place to place; in other words, the weight accorded to each individual in their subjectivity. We will wish to make note of the vagaries of different ways of attempting to count violence from assessing hospital admissions to victim surveys. We will reveal, of course, that despite our specification of violence, that violence is a very slippery thing to measure. We will be able to say, however, that rates of violent crime differ markedly from country to country with Honduras having a per-head of population homicide rate 300 times that of Japan (p. 23). We will be able to say that most violent crime is committed by men, and we will be able to say that by-and-large it is the poorer members of humanity that suffer most from, and commit more violent crime (p. 27) and that this is true even in wealthy societies like the USA (p. 51), where the highest levels of violent crime are to be found (currently) in Gary Indiana.

Having identified the dimensions and distribution of violent crime we would be in a position, then, to address the meat of the book, explanations for violent crime, and ideally we would first take a look at those explanations that don’t work. These explanations according to Currie include genetic explanations, lenient sentencing, diversity, and prosperity. In each of these latter three cases, the United States is manifestly on the wrong side of the correlation for these explanations to universally, or simply, make sense of the problem of violent crime. So, then, we should move to the explanations taken by Currie, and other main-stream criminologists to be efficacious in making sense of violent crime. These include inequality, marginal work, weak social supports, strained families, harsh and ineffective criminal justice
systems, and easy access to firearms. We should almost certainly agree with Currie when he says and I make no apology for quoting such an eloquent passage at length)

The societies that are routinely torn by violent crime … are harsh societies – and they are harsh in many ways at once. They foster economic policies that create insecurity and deprivation at the bottom and that concentrate wealth, resources, and opportunity at the top. They offer few social protections for vulnerable people, and they allow the struggling or the unlucky to “fall through the cracks.” They are typically punitive in their approach to offenders, and often their approach to child rearing as well. They are likely to enforce, or at least tolerate the social and economic subordination of women. They are neglectful societies that tend to ignore social problems until they explode into conflict and violence. They are societies characterized by what we might call a “culture of disregard”, in which people feel little sense of public responsibility or solidarity toward others, and a “me first” ethic of personal gain often dominates public and private life (p. 93).

We might, then, albeit less skilfully, elegantly, and with somewhat poorer mastery of the complexity and detail of this criminological problem, arrive at a book something a little like that of Currie.

**The Violence of Criminology**

Or we might not. We might ask some other, or additional questions. We might ask, for example, whether the ‘defining out’ of psychological violence in intimate-partner relationships in our *speci*-fication of violent crime is material to our inquiry, or whether brawling in a bar is material. Is the psychological violence done to critics of various states
around the world material, or the subjective violence inflicted upon the poorer members of society in the limitation of their capacities for self-actualization material? Indeed, we might question the whole materiality of our speci-fication of violence. Violence speci-fied in this way merely evokes eidos: surface or appearance, mere presence to sight. This is not the surface of some entity or phenomenon ‘out there’ waiting to be discovered, but it is the surface attributed to the phenomenon by the observing investigator: the criminological researcher. The specification contains not that which is true, or has been observed as traits or qualities of violence by the criminological observer, but is created or chosen (specified) as a part of a symbolic order that is a tool designed or used to make criminological sense of the world. These boundaries are not set because they are the boundaries of violence but merely because they permit criminological talk about violence and hence make the violent subject thus identified available to governance. However, these boundaries do not permit sense making talk about violence per-se they merely permit talk about the phenomena (more or less) arbitrarily encompassed by them: speci-fied by them. This modernist doxa pre-circumscribes attempts to make sense of the problem at hand since what is says, in an inverted kind of logic, is that the problem is ‘violence’ and we know what violence is do we not. It then accepts the criminological doxa concerning what violence is and sets about describing violence in more detail. We may mangle Hulsman (1986) here – thus specified, violence has no ontological reality, it is the product, not the object of criminological research. The kind of violence of which we speak as criminologists is not autopoietic, it is defined into existence by criminologists for criminologists.

This, I believe, is a problem about which criminology remains in denial. The problem is a modernist one. For the Ptolemaian, the Copernican revolution spoke the death of faith, and since it is faith that dissolves the power of paradox, in the absence of faith the Ptolemaian required a new means of making sense of the world. Without being too rigorous, solutions
were devised, most famously perhaps by Linnaeus; a system of classification: of division or
speci-fication. This process of classification remains at the core of criminology today and it
aids and abets states in their tyrannical violence over their subjects: it does not discover, it
creates governable subjects. If, as we believe, the universe is infinite then it must be made up
of entities of all scales, and if this is so, then the relationship of scale that entities have to one
another are rendered simultaneously infinite and infinitesimal. We assume, for example that
the scale of difference that separates animals from humans is greater than the scale of
difference that separates individual humans from one another. Which of these scales of
difference is taken to be material, depends on the problem of which we are trying to make
sense. However, the problem of which we are trying to make sense is, itself, defined by the
existing specification of the differences between entities. If we wish to speak of a problem
generated by the ‘feckless poor’ we need to define the ‘feckless poor’. So, we ask the
question ‘who are the feckless poor?’ Of course, comes the answer, they are those who are
causing this problem. ‘And what problem would this be?’

‘Well, obviously, it is the problem of the feckless poor’ comes the reply.

This kind of tautologous mystification is at the heart of the mobilization of public opinion by
those with the power and the desire to do so, namely, our rulers. More pertinently to this
discussion is the fact that criminology operates by the same tyrannical processes (Crewe,
2015). What this means is that the solution to any criminological problem depends upon the
success of the definition of the materiality of the differences, or boundaries between entities
that specify the problem. The criminologist specifies both the problem, and the entities that
constitute that problem, from his sphere of ownness; he, like the Ptolemaian God, assembles
the world in his own image. The problem being addressed in Currie’s book is violence, a
process specified by him as being criminal, and hence the subject of the law. It is not new to
suggest that the law is a product of the Modern mind (Goodrich, 1986), it is the product of the radical self-knowledge-belief of the Enlightenment. This radical self-knowledge-belief is also the ground for the *claims* of epistemological privilege evident in law. Hence, the product of the law and its *claims* to authority justify each other on the same grounds: a Modern arrogance that appears to know few bounds. As Schinkel would have it “[t]he nature of its self-deceit, or of its definitional self-referentiality … lies in an abstraction that is due to a misrepresentation of itself …” (2002, p. 135), and, we might add, ‘to itself’. Thus, the object of the law is subject to the violence of the law, because she is absent from the law. This is because it is impossible for one subject to be fully present to the subjectivity of another; the Other-as-she-is-for-herself is always available to her before any kind of intellection of mine. Hence the object of the law is also constructed by the law. Criminology is a species of violent modernity in that it is that study that tyrannically makes available the criminal Other as the possible object of governance by constituting her in her absence. The categories such as ‘criminal’, ‘delinquent’, ‘sex offender’, or ‘serious’ violence, for example are empty signifiers, and they are the very sub-stance – the methodological hypokeimenon or subject-tum – of the edifice, and practice of criminology¹.

**Violence without criminology**

Let us look now at ways of conceiving of violence outside the bounds of criminology. We have suggested above that criminological study rests on the operationalization of difference, however, should one accept what I have said above we should also be aware that such operationalizations are more or less arbitrary. It is necessary, in order to identify violence outside of criminology, to begin, similarly, outside of criminology in the realm of the un-

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¹ For the most extreme version of this see the FBI’s ‘Unified Crime Reports’ crime categories.
speci-fied. Without crossing over into the metaphysical, we can dip our toes into the transcendent, so to speak, in that we can begin from the position of the human subject. The nature of our subjectivity is unique to each of us, furthermore, every human possesses some kind of subjectivity\(^2\) in that it is inextricably bound up with the capacity to represent ourselves to ourselves as ourselves, or the experience of being a subject, which condition persists at the highest possible level of generalization of the nature of the human, and what Mead contests is what constitutes the very process of self (2015 [1934]) in view of our capacity for intentionality\(^3\). Moreover, it is this capacity that permits us to ‘measure’ the similarity and difference between us and others because we can represent both to ourselves. Further to this, however, we might strongly suggest we have privileged access to our subjectivity. In Levinasian terms, we exist for-ourselves before any intellection of any other, or as Sartre says, our observation of the subjectivity of another is always undertaken from our own subjectivity (1967 [1957]). What this means, just as in the case of criminology and the law, is that the object of our perception is absent from our construction of her. In other words, what we see we do not discover, we make, and this of course, is itself a form of violence. This kind of violence is, to my mind, related to a more insidious kind of violence that is powerfully implicated in the kind of violence on which Currie wishes to concentrate. Currie’s violence is partial, that of which I spoke a moment ago and of which I now speak are universal. Let us return to The Subject and the question, apparent in Husserl, ‘how is the intentional content of our experience of other minds constituted’? (1969). If we are to grasp this other-centred constitution of meaning, we must establish the facticity of the *Other-as-she-is-for-herself*. This cannot be done by invoking any speci-fication or difference (particularly difference from me as encouraged by Husserl (1969, p. 107)) since such a

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\(^2\) See Thomas Nagel *What is it Like to Be a Bat* (1974)

\(^3\) Not intent, but directedness of mind.
judgement – or measurement – would have to arise from my sphere of ownness. In the face of this solipsism of Husserl’s, Sartre (1967 [1957], p. 302) encourages us to begin with the way we experience our selves as the object of the Other. According to Sartre, should we inhabit the world as a monad we would experience only the haeceity of the world, i.e., we would be able merely to consume its isness. We would not be able to thematise it since there would be no other with whom to negotiate meanings: the world would have no aboutness. This is emphasised in Sartre by his insistence that our first encounter (our first movements) with the Other manifests itself in the form of shame. When another approaches me in my role as mere consumer of the isness of the world, says Sartre, I am cast by her as a voyeur (1967 [1957], p. 353). These meanings, for Sartre, are a species of normativity, and clearly relate the existential (intersubjective) nature of the world to its normative structure in that they arise from the freedom present in the separation of the for-itself from the in-itself (Sartre, 1967 [1957]). However, we may observe of Sartre’s relation of freedom and normativity that normativity is constraint, and, we take it, freedom is its absence. How then should we proceed in the face of this paradox? The answer is to be found in Levinas.

We must first state when speaking of Levinasian ethics, that Levinas is not in the business of constructing an ethic like Rawls ‘fairness’ or Kant’s ‘Categorical Imperative’ for example. Levinas is not interested in some ethical prescription or test, he is interested in the place of the ethical in the intersubjective relationship: how I, the subject, stand vis-a-vis the Other. This is in no manner a code or set of rules. For Sartre, the Other brings with her a law, the establishment of normativity that defines my freedom by showing its limits since it reveals a contest between two competing claims for freedom, and the claim of the Other can only be

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5 Following Husserl when he says “the intrinsically first other (the first non-Ego) is the Other ego” (Husserl, 1969, p. 107)
recognized by me from my own subjectivity. Hence (because it arises from my subjectivity) Sartre says that this must be the *second* movement (1967 [1957], p. 382), however, our attempt to identify the root of the intersubjective and its ethicality must be to establish the nature of the *first movement*. Levinas addresses this problem by insisting that the Other brings with her not a law but a command, and she brings this to the relationship before I have any intellection of her. A command does not merely come into conflict with my freedom as would a law, but it creates an obligation from which I cannot resile. The command revealed by (the face of) the Other is “thou shalt not commit murder” (Levinas, 1969, p. 199).

Levinas notes elsewhere that this command “is the end of powers” (op. cit., p. 87) the end of my freedom, my ‘I can’s. That is, not that my freedom can be done away with nor that my freedom no longer conflicts with the freedom of others but that my freedom has a limit and that limit is set by a command in a way that a law cannot. Of course, one may argue, I can commit murder and one would be right, however, this does not eradicate the command, this simply means that were I to kill, I would have chosen to ignore or transgress the command: neither the command nor the obligation goes away. In killing I have failed in my obligation, not eradicated it. The command reveals an irrevocable asymmetry that is a phenomenologically necessary quality of my relationship with the other in that she constitutes me in my experience by *my response to the command emanating from her, prior to her in any way entering my experience*. My first experience of myself is formed in my obligation to her before any kind of communality. Hence the command (the obligation) uncovers the normative nature of the intersubjective; the ethical and the mode of experiencing anything as

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7 There is not room here to examine Levinas’ concept ‘The Face’. For a discussion of this concept see Peperzak (1997); Morgan (2011); Perpich (2008).
8 For an examination of the relationship between ‘power’ and capacity (‘can’) see my 2014 (pp. 137-164 Chap. 7) or my (2010).
anything at all (normativity\(^9\)) are disclosed as being inseparable: ethics is shown to be first philosophy.

I mentioned earlier that Levinas is not interested in a set of ethical rules but in the place of the ethical in the intersubjective, the structure of which I have adumbrated above. What this means to us in our consideration of violence is that we do violence to the Other every time we fail in our obligation to her, which obligation is elicited by her command. This, of course is not just limited to murder. The obligation to the Other is infinite and manifests itself, according to Levinas in a universal responsibility. Levinas' insistence that rather than Sartre’s ‘law’, the Other brings a command, and that a command imposes an irrecusable obligation, the question ‘Who am I?’ cannot be answered by recourse to my own experience. It must happen by examining my response to the obligation to the Other before I have any communality with her whatsoever, and this response discloses my responsibility for the other; I can, therefore I must respond. Responsibility, however, has more dimensions that we generally imagine. I may speak of responsibility to myself, responsibility for myself, responsibility for myself to others, and responsibility for others\(^{10}\). It is the latter of these which is of interest here. Conventionally when we speak of responsibility for others we have in mind the kind of relationship that frequently occurs between children and parents in virtue of the perceived deficiencies of childhood. Levinas, in contrast, has in mind not an ‘accounting for’ oneself or ‘answering for’ another, but where the responsible self is an irreplaceable substitute for the Other: any and every Other. Hence, axiomatically, and without any possibility if things being otherwise, I sublimate my responsibility for myself or to myself into responsibility for the other, resulting in the erasure of my ‘ego’. This ego is the self-replicating bunker from whence modernity launches its violence: the violence that


\(^{10}\) I have elsewhere referred to these kinds of responsibility as ‘mere responsibility’ (2011 Op. cit.).
constrains the freedom of all others solely from my sphere of ownness. All violence is of this form, and Currie’s ‘serious’ violence is therefore merely a subset (although a nasty one) thereof. What this further means it that violence is universal and that any attempt to specify it is in itself an act of violence upon those thus specified (c.f. inter alia, Becker, 1963) and, perhaps more importantly, those excluded from the specification (victims of intimate-partner psychological violence or slavery for example). This, for me, is an important aspect of Currie’s text. One might suggest that acts of ‘serious’ violence axiomatically must involve a ‘serious’ abrogation of the perpetrator’s responsibility for the Other-as-she-is-for-herself, however, a similar abrogation occurs in queue (line) jumping, illegal parking, dropping litter, playing music too loud, promoting climate change, imposing low wages, people trafficking, high bonuses, poor safety standards, et cetera ad infinitum; indeed, all those behaviours (and more) that critical criminologists have struggled for decades to bring under the banner of conventional (administrational, evaluative) criminology. Violence does not have to “harm the physical integrity of the individual” (Oberwittler & Hofer, 2005, p. 469) violence is universal, it is embedded in the impossibility of fully satisfying our obligations to the Other.

Criminology without violence

This position is interesting for criminology; it suggests that the ethical is at the root of all intersubjectivity – all social relations. It has been suggested to me in numerous conversations that criminology has nothing to do with ethics and vice versa. Clearly, however, since criminology is entirely bound up with the social, axiomatically the ethical must matter to it – it must be material. Because I do not choose this obligation freely I cannot pass on my responsibility to others: I cannot ask another to stand in my shoes. Of this state of affairs Levinas was wont to invoke Dostoevsky in the Brothers Karamazov:
I am responsible for the Other without waiting for his reciprocity.... Reciprocity is his affair.... It is I who support all, [... as in] that sentence in Dostoevsky: "We are all guilty of all and for all men before all, and I more than the others." This is not owing to such or such a guilt which is really mine, or to offences that I would have committed; but because I am responsible for a total responsibility, which answers for all the others and for all in the others, even for their responsibility. I always have one responsibility more than the others (Levinas in Vinokurof, 2013).

This realization brings to criminology new obligations, challenges, and opportunities. A commonly held view of the purpose of criminology is that it is intended to help reduce crime. Some say, because the nature of crime is in the gift of power, that criminology should seek to reduce harm\textsuperscript{11}. The role of any kind of inquiry is to reduce suffering. Any kind of suffering that can be reduced and isn’t constitutes violence, if only by omission. Failure to fulfil our obligation to the other, to reduce their suffering, constitutes a derogation of our duty as human beings since being in this ethical relationship with Others is what constitutes us as human. Criminology, then, must cease to do violence by leaving behind its scientific, rational, and Modern past: it must refuse dualistic modes of thought, it must dissolve all the boundaries it has spent the past one hundred and fifty years assembling. We must recognize that in addition to being unable to grasp the full nature of the other’s subjectivity because it originates in our experience, we cannot know the whole of the assemblage that constitutes the Other in their being: the trace of everything that they have been, thought, or experienced in any way. Hence we do violence whenever we attempt to judge or categorize, and we do this every time we speak of crime; we seem to wish only to alleviate the suffering of those

\textsuperscript{11} For a discussion on crime harm and power see my (2011)
deemed material to the law. We must cease to judge; we must simply bear witness to crime and social justice, as Quinney (2000) would have it.

Modern Western philosophy is suffused with the telos of perfection – an inexorable procession with homo-rationalicus in the van. Not only is rationality tautologically defined it constitutes a ‘regime of truth’ in Foucault’s (1977) terms.

Universal suffering

Explanation for this kind of violence

Why is violence a response to these strains

We have, in these pages, a kind of violence defined into existence that suits the purpose of the book.