Multiagent Systems

Multiagent systems combine multiple autonomous entities, each having diverging interests or different information. This comprehensive overview of the field offers a computer science perspective but also draws on ideas from game theory, economics, operations research, logic, philosophy, and linguistics. It will serve as a reference for researchers in each of these fields and be used as a text for advanced undergraduate or graduate courses.

The authors emphasize foundations to create a broad and rigorous treatment of their subject, with thorough presentations of distributed problem solving, non-cooperative game theory, multiagent communication and learning, social choice, mechanism design, auctions, cooperative game theory, and modal logics of knowledge and belief. For each topic, basic concepts are introduced, examples are given, proofs of key results are offered, and algorithmic considerations are examined. An appendix covers background material in probability theory, classical logic, Markov decision processes, and mathematical programming.

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Multiagent Systems

Algorithmic, Game-Theoretic, and Logical Foundations

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KEVIN LEYTON-BROWN
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To my wife, Noa, and my daughters, Maia, Talia, and Ella
—YS

To Jude
—KLB
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Introduction

Imagine a personal software agent engaging in electronic commerce on your behalf. Say the task of this agent is to track goods available for sale in various online venues over time, and to purchase some of them on your behalf for an attractive price. In order to be successful, your agent will need to embody your preferences for products, your budget, and in general your knowledge about the environment in which it will operate. Moreover, the agent will need to embody your knowledge of other similar agents with which it will interact (e.g., agents who might compete with it in an auction or agents representing store owners)—including their own preferences and knowledge. A collection of such agents forms a multiagent system. The goal of this book is to bring under one roof a variety of ideas and techniques that provide foundations for modeling, reasoning about, and building multiagent systems.

Somewhat strangely for a book that purports to be rigorous, we will not give a precise definition of a multiagent system. The reason is that many competing, mutually inconsistent answers have been offered in the past. Indeed, even the seemingly simpler question—What is a (single) agent?—has resisted a definitive answer. For our purposes, the following loose definition will suffice: Multiagent systems are those systems that include multiple autonomous entities with either diverging information or diverging interests, or both.

Scope of the book

The motivation for studying multiagent systems often stems from interest in artificial (software or hardware) agents, for example software agents living on the Internet. Indeed, the Internet can be viewed as the ultimate platform for interaction among self-interested, distributed computational entities. Such agents can be trading agents of the sort discussed above, “interface agents” that facilitate the interaction between the user and various computational resources (including other interface agents), game-playing agents that assist (or replace) human players in a multiplayer game, or autonomous robots in a multi-robot environment. However, although the material is written by computer scientists with computational sensibilities, it is quite interdisciplinary, and the material is in general fairly abstract. Many of the ideas apply to—and indeed are often taken from—inquiries about human individuals and institutions.

The material spans disciplines as diverse as computer science (including artificial intelligence, theory, and distributed systems), economics (chiefly
microeconomic theory), operations research, analytic philosophy, and linguistics. The technical material includes logic, probability theory, game theory, and optimization. Each of the topics covered easily supports multiple independent books and courses, and this book does not aim to replace them. Rather, the goal has been to gather the most important elements from each discipline and weave them together into a balanced and accurate introduction to this broad field. The intended reader is a graduate student or an advanced undergraduate, prototypically, but not necessarily, in computer science.

Because the umbrella of multiagent systems is so broad, the questions of what to include in any book on the topic and how to organize the selected material are crucial. To begin with, this book concentrates on foundational topics rather than surface applications. Although we will occasionally make reference to real-world applications, we will do so primarily to clarify the concepts involved; this is despite the practical motivations professed earlier. And so this is the wrong text for the reader interested in a practical guide to building this or that sort of software. The emphasis is rather on important concepts and the essential mathematics behind them. The intention is to delve in enough detail into each topic to be able to tackle some technical material, and then to point the reader in the right directions for further education on particular topics.

Our decision was thus to include predominantly established, rigorous material that is likely to withstand the test of time, and to emphasize computational perspectives where appropriate. This still left us with vast material from which to choose. In understanding the selection made here, it is useful to keep in mind the following keywords: coordination, competition, algorithms, game theory, and logic. These terms will help frame the chapter overview that follows.

Overview of the chapters

Starting with issues of coordination, we begin in Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 with distributed problem solving. In these multiagent settings there is no question of agents’ individual preferences; there is some global problem to be solved, but for one reason or another it is either necessary or advantageous to distribute the task among multiple agents, whose actions may require coordination. These chapters are thus strongly algorithmic. The first one looks at distributed constraint-satisfaction problems. The latter addresses distributed optimization and specifically examines four algorithmic methods: distributed dynamic programming, action selection in distributed MDPs, auction-like optimization procedures for linear and integer programming, and social laws.

We then begin to embrace issues of competition as well as coordination. Whereas the area of multiagent systems is not synonymous with game theory, there is no question that game theory is a key tool to master within the field, and so we devote several chapters to it. Chapters 3, 5, and 6 constitute a crash course in noncooperative game theory. They cover, respectively, the normal form, the extensive form, and a host of other game representations. In these chapters, as in others that draw on game theory, we culled the material that in our judgment
is needed in order to be a knowledgeable consumer of modern-day game theory. Unlike traditional game theory texts, we also include discussion of algorithmic considerations. In the context of the normal-form representation, that material is sufficiently substantial to warrant its own chapter, Chapter 4.

We then switch to two specialized topics in multiagent systems. In Chapter 7 we cover multiagent learning. The topic is interesting for several reasons. First, it is a key facet of multiagent systems. Second, the very problems addressed in the area are diverse and sometimes ill understood. Finally, the techniques used, which draw equally on computer science and game theory (as well as some other disciplines), are not straightforward extensions of learning in the single-agent case.

In Chapter 8 we cover another element unique to multiagent systems: communication. We cover communication in a game-theoretic setting, as well as in cooperative settings traditionally considered by linguists and philosophers (except that we see that there too a game-theoretic perspective can creep in).

Next is a three-chapter sequence that might be called “protocols for groups.” Chapters 9 covers social-choice theory, including voting methods. This is a nonstrategic theory, in that it assumes that the preferences of agents are known, and the only question is how to aggregate them properly. Chapter 10 covers mechanism design, which looks at how such preferences can be aggregated by a central designer even when agents are strategic. Finally, Chapter 11 looks at the special case of auctions.

Chapter 12 covers coalitional game theory, in recent times somewhat neglected within game theory and certainly underappreciated in computer science. The material in Chapters 1–12 is mostly Bayesian and/or algorithmic in nature. And thus the tools used in them include probability theory, utility theory, algorithms, Markov decision problems (MDPs), and linear/integer programming. We conclude with two chapters on logical theories in multiagent systems. In Chapter 13 we cover modal logic of knowledge and belief. This material hails from philosophy and computer science, but it turns out to dovetail very nicely with the discussion of Bayesian games in Chapter 6. Finally, in Chapter 14 we extend the discussion in several directions—we discuss how beliefs change over time, logical models of games, and how one might begin to use logic to model motivational attitudes (such as “intention”) in addition to the informational ones (knowledge, belief).

Required background

The book is rigorous and requires mathematical thinking, but only basic background knowledge. In much of the book we assume knowledge of basic computer science (algorithms, complexity) and basic probability theory. In more technical parts we assume familiarity with Markov decision problems (MDPs), mathematical programming (specifically, linear and integer programming), and classical logic. All of these (except basic computer science) are covered briefly in appendices, but those are meant as refreshers and to establish notation, not as a
substitute for background in those subjects. This is true in particular of probability theory. However, above all, a prerequisite is a capacity for clear thinking.

**How to teach (and learn) from this book**

There are partial dependencies among the 13 chapters. To understand them, it is useful to think of the book as consisting of the following “blocks.”

- **Block 1**, Chapters 1–2: Distributed problem solving
- **Block 2**, Chapters 3–6: Noncooperative game theory
- **Block 3**, Chapter 7: Learning
- **Block 4**, Chapter 8: Communication
- **Block 5**, Chapters 9–11: Protocols for groups
- **Block 6**, Chapter 12: Coalitional game theory
- **Block 7**, Chapters 13–14: Logical theories

Within every block there is a sequential dependence (except within Block 1, in which the sections are largely independent of each other). Among the blocks, however, there is only one strong dependence: Blocks 3, 4, and 5 each depend on some elements of noncooperative game theory and thus on block 2 (though none requires the entire block). Otherwise there are some interesting local pairwise connections between blocks, but none that require that both blocks be covered, whether sequentially or in parallel.

Given this weak dependence among the chapters, there are many ways to craft a course out of the material, depending on the background of the students, their interests, and the time available. The book’s Web site contains several specific syllabi that have been used by us and other colleagues, as well as additional resources for both students and instructors.

**On pronouns and gender**

We use male pronouns to refer to agents throughout the book. We debated this between us, not being happy with any of the alternatives. In the end we reluctantly settled on the “standard” male convention rather than the reverse female convention or the grammatically dubious “they.” We urge the reader not to read patriarchal intentions into our choice.
Multiagent Systems. System or organizations of interacting autonomous agents. Possibly distributed. Over multiple computers and/or in an environment. Possibly belonging to different stakeholders or different organization. Composite multiagent systems. Open applications. Collaborating and/or Competing. Striving at a shared global goal. Self-interested agents striving at maximising their own. Multiagent systems are distributed systems. Engineering a multiagent system means rigorously specifying the communications among the agents by way of interaction protocols. What makes specifying the protocols for agent interaction especially interesting and challenging is that agents are autonomous and heterogeneous entities. These properties of agents have profound implications on the nature of protocol specifications. Multiagent Systems. A Modern Approach to Distributed Artificial Intelligence. Edited by Gerhard Weiss. This is the first comprehensive introduction to multiagent systems and contemporary distributed artificial intelligence that is suitable as a textbook. The book provides detailed coverage of basic topics as well as several closely related ones. Unlike traditional textbooks, the book brings together many leading experts, guaranteeing a broad and diverse base of knowledge and expertise.