Turkey, as 'Other' and being 'Othered'
The 'Images' and 'representations' of Turkey in Western Europe
and the role they play in the 'othering' of Turkey

by

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...Before I start,
When I was walking through the poor, lively, extremely coloured, crowded and dirty bazaar of Luxor (Egypt), I felt like a ‘European’. When I was eating ‘kebabs’ with a big, childish smile on my face and with the feeling to be home again, in a small, poor village of K.Maras (Turkey), I knew, I was not a ‘European’... Yet the point disturbed me was not that Americans, who probably came from a more organised and sterilised parts of world. What really surprised me were the a bit ‘superior’ feelings that I had in the bazaar in Luxor. I was in a horse-carriage (which was one of the most important tourist attractions), having the look to the ‘others’ inevitably from up (!): to the people who were sitting on the dirty streets and either playing some games or selling their things or talking to each other. Each shop with a different melody coming out, meat outside the butcher shop with flies and dust on it, people with multi-coloured, either traditional or modern clothes, children running, playing and screaming around, every thing was like a film for me. I enjoyed seeing all these different things as I was in a movie. ‘Me’, safe and comfortable in the horse-carriage and ‘them’, trying to earn a bit money, thus screaming around to sell their products in the streets; their children, running after the horse-carriage, as they do not have Play-Station games to play; the women, trying to find the cheapest of the cheapest in order to cook for the dinner... Luxor...rich of colours, poor of money, dirty in the appearance, innocent in the soul, so brunette, so loud, so musical, so energetic, so lazy, so happy, so helpless, so lively, so young, so Luxor...Smiles on the faces; real smiles...smiles in spite of the poorness, smiles without reasons like to sell the items...smiles, different than the salesmen in Berlin, Paris or London, who smile because of the client satisfaction or company policy... All these what I have seen, should have meant a bit more than an interesting show to the Western eyes, I thought, with a bit mixing myself into the Western eyes. Then I realised I was somewhere in the middle, where I could reach to the East and West, or say, South and North. I was somewhere in the middle of the world: on the bridge. I was like Turkey. I felt like Turkey: in the middle, neither West nor East, neither European, nor Asian, African, Oriental...None of them, all of them.

This experience showed me that I could partly share and understand both the feelings of the people from ‘Western’ world who came to a ‘different’ world and the feelings of the local people of Egypt, who are hurt by the ruthless criticisms of their manners or life styles. Since that time, I am reading and writing about the ‘different worlds’ of the glob. Since that time I am trying to convince people to be open to other cultures, not to behave according to the stereotypes they have in their minds and rather, to develop universal personalities rather than European, Eastern, Western, Oriental or so on.

I enjoy the richness of the life, with all different cultures, identities and life-styles.

INTRODUCTION
We do live in confusing times. On the one hand, we are experiencing globalisation, 'The New World Order' and multiculturalism, on the other hand, we are introduced to 'glocalisation', 'ethnic identities' and still there is a requirement for monoculturalism. Countries and people with similar cultures are coming together in cultural, social and economic co-operations. As an example, the triad blocs of Asia, North America, and Europe are consolidating their global positions through strategic trade alliances. Yet what about the countries which are left outside of these co-operations because of their 'differences'. Are they to be blamed because of their 'not homogeneous societies', 'different' cultures and religions?

It seems to be that the 'new world order' is more likely to require 'clear' identities, which is 'homogeneous' and in a way 'mono-cultural'. People tend to cling more to their own sense of cultural identity. The 'common culture', what we talk about remain superficial, since it is not enough to eat McDonald's in Prague, drink Coca-Cola in Beijing and eat Kebab in Berlin to have a common culture. There continue to be clear differences between cultures and societies and people tend to underline these differences, as they have also the fear to lose their identities. Now that most of the countries are getting involved into groups between each other, they have to choose their partners for these marriages. Of course, they want to be sure with 'who' they will be in deal with. So, each country should make its identity clear, to underline it and then to claim: "I am this" and "I belong here". Yet the case is more complicated. It is not enough to make your identity clear and to underline it. Your identity as a country has to be accepted and approved. In other words, "You have to be chosen" as well. The identity of a country is an issue, which is related to the 'others', other countries' identities. As we already know, the 'Self' is always related with 'Other'.

When we look at to the position of Turkey in that big picture, we see that Turkey remained outside of these groups. Certainly there are many reasons for that, like political, economical, social and cultural. However, in this
dissertation am going to discuss some aspects of this isolation, or say 'othering' of Turkey. Since we cannot discuss about 'othering' without the stereotypes, which helped to create the very notion of 'Other', we will start with examining 'stereotypes'. My main area will be the 'images' and 'representations' of Turkey in Western Europe in the frame of 'othering' and 'stereotypes'. Thus, my first chapter will be about the 'need to stereotype', how we construct them, why they may be dangerous and how we reflect them while encountering with the 'Other'. Then I will move to the notion of 'other', why we need the 'other', how we represent the 'other' and how the 'other' is 'othered'.

In the second chapter, I will try to highlight the stereotypes, images and representations of Turkey. This chapter will help us to understand the link between the stereotypes about Turkey and its 'othering'. I will mention the importance of the religion, the associations with East, which means 'not-West' in order to show the reasons to be excluded from Europe. I also will discuss the role of the Turkish migrant worker in Europe in the creation of the general image of the Turk. Again, this will bring us to the Turk, who cannot belong 'Us'(Europe), because he is different and actually, peculiar.

My third chapter aims to deepen the discussion about the image of Turkey and Turks. Thus I will analyse the media discourses about Turkey. I have chosen three British newspapers as examples for this analysis, since there is no place to analyse more newspapers from other countries. The representations of Turkey have helped to see the picture of Turkey from West clearer.

In the final chapter I will turn to the discussion about searching for an identity in the 'new world order' and I will try to show the connection between Turkey, '-othered' from Europe- and the stereotypes about and the images of Turkey. I will argue that there is a strong relation in how Turkey is seen and interpreted in Europe and why it has been excluded and 'othered'.

CHAPTER 1

STEREOTYPES AND 'OTHER'
1.1. STEREOTYPES and 'STEREOTYPING'

"The human mind must think with the aid of categories...once formed, categories are the basis for normal prejudgement. We cannot possibly avoid this process. Orderly living depends on it...our experience in life tends to form itself into clusters (concepts, categories), and while we may call on the right cluster at the wrong time, or the wrong cluster at the right time, still the process in question dominates our entire mental life. A million events befall us every day. We cannot handle so many events. If we think of them at all, we type them." (Allport, 1954; 20)

This statement of Gordon Allport shows the inevitability of categorisation. There seems nothing wrong at the beginning with the 'need to categorisation', till we make the connection with the 'need to stereotype'. In this chapter, I will attempt to define 'stereotypes', 'the need to stereotype', 'how the stereotypes are constructed', and 'what is wrong with stereotypes'. The discussion on stereotypes will lead us then 'the way the stereotypes kept in mind and brought to on encounter with the 'Other'. These discussions on 'stereotyping' and 'othering' will help us to understand the image of Turkey in Western Europe, since in the relationship between Turkey and the West, there are some roles played by the 'stereotypes' and there are some problems rooted from 'othering'. Later on, the discussion on 'stereotypes' and 'other' will be benefited again in the chapter with analysis of the British Press on Turkey, since the representation of the 'Other' is crucial in media and stereotypes are constructed in the media, as well.

Before I start with the definitions of stereotypes, I want to draw attention to the 'need to categorisation'. From my point of view, it is 'the need to categorisation' that we have in our minds the continents such as America, Africa, Europe, or Asia. It is again the need to categorisation that there are Latin America, Far East or Middle East. We have the categories and sub-
categories in our heads in order to perceive the world easier, yet it causes also problems, since we expect these categories to be homogeneous. When we realise that they are not as homogeneous as we thought, we do not want to accept it. As an example, I realised that Turkey, in Western Europe, most of the times, categorised as a Middle East country. I do not claim that Turkey is a European country or something else, as I know the problems with categorisation. Yet the point is that Turkey seems to be simplified (when Turkey wanted to be excluded, 'othered') to an Islamic, poor Middle Eastern country, with ethnic conflicts and human rights violations. This is likely to be the first frame for Turkey in western eyes. Of course, it is the sunny country with historical places, coasts and beaches, yet it is not Greece, for what people have firstly the image of this sunny picture. In this dissertation, I aimed to show the 'non-Western' images of Turkey, rooted both from Turkey itself and from the stereotypes about Turkey.

There are contradictories in the picture of Turkey, since the images do not match and satisfy the stereotypes, like Muslim and secular, Middle Eastern but nice for summer holidays and etc. There are also problems in Turkey itself since people have the need to belong somewhere in the world and Turkey seems to be an ‘in-between country’, because of its multicultural features and thus ‘othered’ character. However, let me begin first with the definition of stereotypes and then we will move step by step.

The term 'stereotype' was introduced in 1922, by the journalist Walter Lippman in his book, Public Opinion. As a commentator on current events, Lippmann was struck by the way different observers could "see" the same event in dramatically different ways, and he emphasised the role of preconceptions-or, to use his vividly descriptive phrase, "pictures in our heads"- in determining one's perceptions of people and events.
When applied to group perceptions, these 'pictures in our heads' are preconceptions that members of the group are all alike and not distinguishable from each other. To capture this idea, Lippmann borrowed the term 'stereotype' from the printing industry, where it referred to a metal plate used in making duplicate pages of the same type. In doing so he gave a new, and lasting meaning to the term. (Hamilton, Stroessner, Driscoll, 1994; 293) As Lippmann puts it:

"Modern life is hurried and multifarious...there is neither time nor opportunity for intimate acquaintance. Instead we notice a trait which marks a well known type, and fill in the rest of the picture by means of the stereotypes we carry about in our heads...the subtlest and most pervasive of all influences are those which create and maintain the repertory of stereotypes. We are told about the world before we see it. We imagine most things before we experience them. And those preconceptions...govern deeply the whole process of perception. They mark out certain objects as familiar or strange, emphasising the difference, so that the slightly familiar is seen as very familiar, and somewhat strange as sharply alien...they are aroused by small signs...aroused, they flood fresh vision with older images and project into the world what has resurrected in memory." (1961)

This quotation describes the consequences of pre-existing stereotypes for the process of social perception. According to Lipmann, there are emotionally tinted general presuppositions that precede, direct, and filter information, and they applied this definition to widespread assumptions about the traits of national-ethnic groups, some of which could probably not be based on experience- the American students questioned were unlikely to have met Turks, for example.

The Classical study by Katz and Braly(1933, 1935) defined the operationalisation of the concept of stereotype for decades. It combined the investigation of stereotype and prejudice, demonstrating that the well-known 'Negroes' and the practically unknown 'Turks' were the least likeable, and had the least favourable characteristics in the eyes of white, middle-class American university students. The first group were said to be 'superstitious'(84%) and lazy(75%), as the second group there was less agreement, the most frequent assumption (54%) being that the Turks were
'ruthless'. While they demonstrated a clear-cut relationship between attitude towards a group and the evaluative tint of the traits describing their profile, it could not be shown that the social uniformity of the characterization depended on the evaluative attitude, nor on the degree of acquaintance with the group (although the two together seem to explain why certain features of the known, but rejected groups ('negroes' and 'jews') were considered as characteristic by most respondents.) (Hunyady, 1998:43)

We see that the stereotyped description of groups was closer to *prejudice*, a mostly negative attitude. One of the dangers of stereotypes is that they are very close to *prejudice*. Even that we do not know enough about a group, -like in this example with the American students' opinions of Turks-, we may already have opinions about this group. As Lippmann puts is, we imagine most things before we experience them. Giddens says that *prejudice* refers to opinions and attitudes held by members of one group towards another. A prejudiced person's preconceived views are often based on hearsay rather than on direct evidence, and are resistant to change even in the face of new information. (Giddens, 212)

Derived from the printers' term for a plate cast from a mould, a 'stereotype' refers to a fixed mental impression. It is defined by Gordon Allport as: 'an exaggerated belief associated with a category. Its function is to justify (rationalise) our conduct in relation to that category.' This definition implies a discrepancy between an objectively ascertainable reality and a subjective perception of that reality. (van den Berghe, 1996:354)

When we look at the field of race and ethnic relations, a 'stereotype' is often defined as an overgeneralization about the behaviour or other characteristics of members of particular groups. Ethnic and racial stereotypes can be positive or negative, although they are more frequently negative. Even ostensibly positive stereotypes can often imply a negative evaluation. Thus to say that blacks are musical and have a good sense of rhythm comes close to the more openly negative stereotype that they are childish, and happy-go-lucky. Van der Berghe argues that it is a difficult empirical question to determine
where a generalisation about a group ceases to be an objective description of reality and becomes a stereotype. He mentions the difficulty of ascertaining the gap between the objective reality and the subjective perception, and claims, thereof, the concept of 'stereotype' is not a useful scientific tool in the analysis of behaviour. (van der Berghe, 1996; 356) I believe that the point is not the gap between reality and subjectivism, the point is the consequences of 'stereotyping', it is not the most important thing if they represent the reality or not, as the reality is different to everyone, it is how the stereotypes are practised.

If we want to understand how racialized regime of representation actually works, we should examine more deeply the set of representational practices known as stereotyping. 'Stereotyping' reduces people to a few, simple, essential characteristics, which are represented as fixed by Nature. Here we examine some more aspects: the construction of 'otherness' and exclusion; and, 'stereotyping and power'. (Hall, 1997; 257)

'Stereotyping' as a signifying practice is central to the representation of racial difference. In his essay on 'Stereotyping', Richard Dyer makes an important distinction between typing and stereotyping. He argues that, without the use of types, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to make sense of the world. We understand the world by referring individual objects, people, or events in our heads to the general classificatory schemes into which -according to our culture - they fit.

Thus, we 'decode' a flat object on legs on which we place things as a 'table'. We may never have seen that kind of 'table' before, but we have a general concept or category of 'table' in our heads, into which we 'fit' the particular objects we perceive or encounter. In other words, we understand 'the particular' in terms of its 'type'. We deploy what Alfred Schutz called typifications. In this sense, 'typing' is essential to the production of meaning. (ibid)
The concept of typifications is central to Schutz's understanding of how human beings go about building up an understanding of the social world. The starting point for Schutz's analysis of mundane knowledge is his delineation of its *typicality*. He argues that an experiencing consciousness is inherently a typifying one. In order to deal with our daily business humans have to have a degree of familiarity and pre-acquaintance with objects. This functions as a scheme of reference for individuals. Even the utterly novel and unfamiliar is grasped as such against this pre-established background of normality and typicality. The stock of knowledge at hand minimally comprises type constructs of objects and typified 'recipe knowledge' concerning the 'how to do it' of all kinds of courses of action. (Heritage, 1984)

"For example, the outer world is not experienced as an arrangement of individual unique objects, dispersed in time and space, but as mountains, tree, animals, fellow men. I may never have seen an Irish Setter but if I see one, I know it is an animal and in particular a dog, showing all the familiar features and typical behaviour of a dog and not, say of a cat." (Schutz, 1967)

Objects are not normally experienced as unique because to do so would be to experience them, as it were, for the first time. Instead, we hold in our minds the knowledge of typical objects, gained through a process of socialisation. These typifications act as stock of resources for us in our dealings with the world, types against which we can compare our sensory data.

Richard Dyer argues that we are always 'making sense' of things in terms of some wider categories. Thus, for example, we come to know something about a person by thinking of the roles which he or she performs: is he/she a parent, a worker, a lover or an old age pensioner? We assign him/her to the membership of different groups, according to gender, class, nationality, 'race' and so on. We order him/her within these different personality type- is he/she a happy, serious, depressed kind of person? Our picture of who the person is built up out of the information we accumulate from positioning him/her with these different orders of 'typification'. (Hall, 1997;257)
In broad terms, then, ‘a type is any simple, vivid, memorable, easily grasped and widely recognised characterisation in which a few traits are foregrounded and change or ‘development’ is kept to a minimum’. The difference between a type and a stereotype is then, stereotypes get hold of the few ‘simple, vivid, memorable, easily grasped and widely recognised’ characteristics about a person, reduce everything about the person to those traits, exaggerate and simplify them, and fix them and without change or development to eternity. So the first point is - stereotyping reduces, essentialises, naturalises, and fixes ‘difference’. (ibid)

Secondly, stereotyping deploys a strategy of ‘splitting’. It divides the normal and the acceptable from the abnormal and the unacceptable. It then excludes or expels everything, which does not fit, which is different. So, another feature of stereotyping is its practice of ‘closure’ and exclusion. It symbolically fixes boundaries, and excludes everything which does not belong, like 'Us' and 'Them'. The third point is that stereotyping tends to occur where there are gross inequalities of power. Power is usually directed against the subordinate or excluded group. One aspect of this power, according Dyer, is ethnocentrism - the application of the norms of one's culture to that of others'. We remember here Derrida's argument that, between binary oppositions like 'Us'/’Them', we are not dealing with...peaceful coexistence...but rather with a violent hierarchy. One of the two terms governs...the other or has the upper hand. (ibid) In other words, stereotyping is what Foucault called a 'power/knowledge' sort of game. It classifies people according to a norm and constructs the excluded as 'Other'. It is also what Gramsci would have been called as an aspect of the struggle for hegemony. Dyer says:

"The establishment of normalcy through social- and stereo-types is one aspect of the habit of ruling groups...to attempt to fashion the whole of society according to their own world view, value system, sensibility and ideology. So right is this world view for the ruling groups that they make it appear as natural and inevitable- and for everyone- and, in so far as they succeed, they establish their hegemony." (ibid;259)

Said, who employed in his book 'Orientalism', both Foucault's notions of discourse and power/knowledge; and Gramsci's concept 'hegemony', claims
that the Orient was Orientalised not only because it was discovered to be
'Oriental' in all those ways considered commonplace by an average
nineteenth-century European, but also because *it could be* - that is, submitted
to being: *made* Oriental.

"It is hegemony, or rather the result of cultural hegemony at work, that
gives Orientalism the durability and the strength...Orientalism is never far
from what Denys Hay has called the idea of Europe, a collective notion
identifying 'us', Europeans as against all 'those' non-Europeans, and indeed
it can be argued that the major component in European culture is precisely
what made that culture hegemonic both in and outside Europe: the idea of
European identity as superior one in comparison with all the non-
European peoples and cultures. There is in addition the hegemony of
European ideas about the Orient, themselves reiterating European
superiority over Oriental backwardness, usually overriding the possibility
that a more independent, or more skeptical, thinker might have had
different views on the matter." (Said, 1995;7)

Before we examine the 'created' dichotomy of 'Us' and 'Them', I want to draw
attention to the connections between stereotypes and the 'Other' and to their
dangers:

"stereotypes, by their crude over-generalizations which include all of a
group, simplify and ignore social diversity. They thus create archetypes.
As Said(1978), Steadman(1969) and Dower (1986) all comment, group
characteristics are presented as if they are universal to the group, often as
specific group or national 'characters' that are inherent, 'natural', and
therefore unchangeable. These characteristics are very often couched in
terms of an implicit moralising dichotomy, which draws boundaries
between 'Them' and 'Us'. But these boundaries are not merely passively
descriptive; they incorporate a value judgement of the group that is
embedded in the power differential between the various groups within that
society. Stereotypes are thus highly emotionally charged. (Breger&Hill,
1998;11)

1.2.THE 'OTHER' and 'OTHERING'

"the Other is always to some extent a creation by the Self" (Tamara Kohn, 1998)

"White Anglo-Saxons frequently use the concept of ethnicity to refer to
'other' people, usually with different skin pigmentation, so that Asian,
Africans, Hispanics and African Americans are ethnic groups but
somehow the English or white Anglo-Saxon Americans are not."
(Baker,1999; 63)
The studies of German-media discourse about foreigners indicated the
existence of a widely held hierarchy of acceptability, depending on the
nationality and culture of the group of foreigners. At the top of the hierarchy
are those groups of foreigners considered almost equals, who are often
portrayed neutrally if not sometimes positively in the media. They tend to look
similar to Germans, have a culture that seems similar, and their countries are
powerful and wealthy trading partners. At the bottom are groups of foreigners
who are considered completely alien, and who are often portrayed negatively
in the media. They tend to come from cultures considered very unfamiliar and
different to German cultures, where physical differences are easily noted, and
whose countries are neither important trading partners, nor very significant
politically in current German politics, that is, their image parallel the power
relationships between the countries. These cultures are often portrayed in
terms of the racist concept of 'national character', and their cultures as 'lesser'
cultures, 'less developed', 'less wealthy', 'less democratic'. (Breger, 1998,
137) Turkey, with its more than two million workers in Germany is one of
these 'lesser' cultures. The very 'otherness' of Turkey, does not only cause
what the Turkish workers in host countries experience, Turkey itself as a
country, experiences a similar kind of 'othering'.

"European Union officials, agreed that the Union is a Christian club and
"Turkey is too poor, too populous, too Muslim, too harsh, too culturally
different, too everything."(Huntington,1997;146)

Merten showed how groups of foreigners were constructed in terms of 'social
problems', in which stereotyped negative character traits were said to cause
the 'foreign problems' in Germany, and that the mere presence of foreigners
was often depicted as being threatening to German culture, values and
interests. (ibid) Furthermore, foreigners were accused to steal the jobs of the
host countries' workers. However, the research of Heckmann and Korte show
that 'guest-workers' were hired for the lowest status, worst paid jobs. These
jobs are the ones, which generally rejected by the German workers. (Breger,
138) Since the Turks are the largest foreigner group in Germany (more than
two millions), and they have been 'othered' and 'stereotyped' like the other
minors or say, foreigners in the world, I will discuss the subject of Turkish workers in Germany and in West Europe in the coming chapter. Since these workers are 'representatives of Turkey' in Western eyes, they have played an important role in creating the Turkish image in general. So, when we discuss about the 'Other', it is not only the workers in Western Europe as 'Other', it is also 'the Turks' all over the world as 'Other'. It is the whole 'stereotype' of the Turk and representing the 'Other'; 'the Turk'. As Senocak puts it:

"What has become a taboo in the case of the Jews because of the Holocaust, has become the acceptable in the case of Turks: the whole stigmatisation of an entire people because of their otherness". (Robins, 1996)

I will discuss the argument above and similar ones to this in the third chapter deeper with referring to Zygmunt Bauman in terms of 'the need to social integration'. Now let us go to the roots of the term 'otherness'. The theme of 'otherness' originates in philosophical queries about the nature of identity. Wherein lies the identity of a thing? Is the difference between same and other a matter of essence or existence? (Pieterse, 1996; 262) Philosophers, such as Heidegger, Hegel, Sartre, Schopenhauer, Husserl and Marcuse were interested in questions like above. However, we will be interested here in cultural difference, which is a major part of 'otherness'. We will try to answer the question, 'Why does difference matter—how can we explain this fascination with otherness?'

As we mentioned above, cultural difference is a major part of otherness. From times immemorial, peoples have considered themselves as 'the people' and all the rest as 'others' -the Greeks and the barbaroi, the Jews and the goyim, the Japanese and the gaijin. In the West, the distinction between Christians and heathens long served as the main boundary between self and others. 'Heretics' and believers in other faiths such as Muslims, Jews, and Orthodox Christians occupied inbetween niches. The Enlightenment introduced romantic preoccupation with the unknown in its ambivalent character of attraction and repulsion. The pathos of the unknown (the wild, the remote) was like a secular version of pantheism or else of the 'hidden God'. 'Others' were embodiments of ideals (the good or noble savage), fears (monsters,
cannibals), objects of desire, windows of mystery. 'Others' were targets of the hatred-scapegoats, as in antisemitism and pogroms. In nineteenth century Orientalism and exoticism all these attitudes are reflected, in a general setting of Western expansion, imperialism, colonialism. (Pieterse, 1996; 262)

A broad tradition in cultural and postcolonial studies examines how others are represented. The main axes of difference are the 'Big Three' of race, class, and gender. Increasingly 'the Other' has been left behind as too narrow and static a notion. There are so many kinds of 'others' that there is little point in generalising about them. Jacques Derrida rephrases the question of otherness in terms of identity and difference. In feminism, cultural studies and sociology, difference increasingly takes the place of otherness. (ibid; 263) As Saussure puts it, it is difference between white and black which signifies, which carries the meaning. Difference matters because it is essential to meaning; without it, meaning could not exist. We know what it is to be British, not only because of certain national characteristics, but also because we can mark its 'difference', from its 'others' -Britishness is not- French, not-American and so on. (Hall, 1997; 234;235) One of the arguments of Said would explain more here:

"...the Orient has helped to define Europe (or the West) as its contrasting image, idea, personality, experience." (Said, 1995; 1,2)

Another argument that we need difference is that because we can only construct meaning through a dialogue with the 'Other'. According to Bakhtin, meaning is established through dialogue, everything we say and mean is modified by the interaction and interplay with another person. (Hall, S., 1997; 236)

The third explanation is anthropological, and is that culture depends on giving things meaning by assigning them to different positions within a classificatory system. The marking of difference is thus the basis of that symbolic order which we call culture. Binary oppositions are crucial for all classification, because one must establish a clear difference between things in order to classify them. Symbolic boundaries are central to all culture. Marking
difference leads us, symbolically, to close ranks, shore up culture and to stigmatise and expel anything, which is defined as impure, abnormal. However, paradoxically, it also makes 'difference' powerful, strongly attractive precisely because it is forbidden, taboo, threatening to cultural order. Thus, 'what is socially peripheral is often symbolically centred'. (ibid;237)

"There can be no concept of 'Self' without a concept of Other, that which Self is not. Although it often appears that a group of people has a clear idea of who belongs and who does not, on closer inspection the divining line proves to be extremely fluid; moreover, definitions can alter markedly over time. The definition of memberships is always both relational and situational; in other words, who is insider can be defined only against who is an outsider, and this is necessarily embedded in the changing political and socio-economic relationships between these groups. Other and Other's culture becomes the symbolic marker of boundaries and of difference." (Breger & Hill, 1998;7)

After looking at the arguments why we need 'difference' and 'otherness', we see that there are two general points to note here, first, from many different directions, and within many different disciplines, this question of ‘difference’ and ‘otherness' has come to play an increasingly significant role. Secondly, 'difference' is ambivalent. It can be both, positive or negative. It is necessary for the production of meaning, the formation of language and culture and for social identities- and at the same time, it is threatening, a site of danger, of negative feelings, of splitting, hostility and aggression towards the 'Other'. (Hall, 1997;238) As van Dijk puts it:

"From the point of view of a 'white man's world', minorities and other Third World peoples are generally categorised as 'them', and opposed to 'us' and, especially in Western Europe, as not belonging, if not as aberration, in white society. (1991)

In his masterpiece 'Orientalism', Said asks, if one can divide human reality, as indeed human reality seems to be genuinely divided, into clearly different cultures, histories, traditions, societies, even races, and survive the consequences humanly. By surviving the consequences humanly, he means to ask whether there is any way of avoiding hospitality expressed by the division, like, of men into 'us' (Westerners) and 'they' (Orientals). For such divisions are generalities whose use historically and actually has been to
press the importance of the distinction between some men and some other men, usually towards not especially admirable ends. He argues:

"When one uses categories like Oriental and Western as both the starting and the end points of analysis, research, public policy, the result is usually to polarise the distinction- the Oriental becomes more Oriental, the Westerner more Western- and limit the human encounter between different cultures, traditions, and societies."(Said, 1995;45,46)

The divisions like normal and abnormal, insiders and outsiders, 'Us' and 'Them', brings us then to 'Stereotyping', which is part of the maintenance of social and symbolic order. It sets up a symbolic frontier between the 'normal' and the 'deviant', the 'normal' and the 'pathological', the 'acceptable' and the 'unacceptable', what 'belongs' and what does not or is 'Other', between 'insiders' and 'outsiders', Us and Them. It facilitates the 'binding' or bonding together of all of Us who are 'normal' into one 'imagined community'; and it sends into symbolic exile all of Them -the Others- who are in some way different-'beyond the pale'. Mary Douglas argued that whatever is 'out of place' is considered as polluted, dangerous, taboo. Negative feelings cluster around it. It must be symbolically excluded if the purity of the culture is to be restored. (Hall, 1997;258)
First, we shall have to consider the 'Turkey' of the European imagination, associated with the memories of the Ottoman threat to Christendom (the Eastern Question), fear of Islamic revival, and resentment against Turkish migration. The projections of the European psyche have been, and remain, fundamental impediments to cultural encounter and understanding.

(Kevin Robins, 1996)

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CHAPTER 2

THE IMAGES OF TURKEY AND THE TURKS

2.1.1 'SUNNY AND HISTORICAL LIKE GREECE, BUT MUSLIM'!

Stone argues that dominant images of Turkey are varied, but in many instances are consistent -especially as they have appeared in the West over the past few hundred years. He says that it is only in recent times that positive image of Turkey has surfaced -predominantly from the European travel industry. In actuality a number of dominant inter-linked images of modern Turkey are dominant images of Ottoman Empire. Such images or texts, operate on three primary levels: the religious (Islam), the cultural, and the historical. (Stone, 1998;35)

In these chapter I will attempt to look at Turkey with West-European eyes in order to see the view from the 'Other' side. While doing this, I will try to highlight the 'images' and also the 'stereotypes' about Turkey, since I believe there is no image without stereotypes.¹ I will show the associations made with Turkey, which are mostly 'non-western'. I am aware of the difficulty to define

¹There is a great variety of negative 'adjectives' attached to the Turks, in all Europe. Some of them are reflections of past social positions and social relations (Ottoman Empire Times) and some of them are reflections of present social positions and relations (migrant Turkish workers in Europe). Wherever they come from or whatever they mean is not the most important point. The point is that some of these images have become stereotypes and are to be seen in the everyday life. Either they are in the relationships with Turks or they are reflected to the news-reports about Turkey or just in the minds.
Western or non-western, yet I am not going to discuss this problematic here. I will use the word non-western to refer to the differences in religion, culture, cuisine, life-styles and so on. However, I believe that the most important difference between the West-world and Turkey and the most important reason being 'othered' is the Muslim character of Turkey. From my point of view, what makes Greece European and Turkey non-European the religion plays a great role. Of course, it is not the only reason, yet it is a very important factor.

"In private, both Europeans and Turks agreed that the real reasons were the intense opposition of the Greeks and, more importantly, the fact that

- In Serbo-Croat there is a range words used to vilify Muslims: the most common are turkecin,'Turk', and balija, usually meaning a violent, lazy and stubborn person. (Halliday, 1995)
- In the novels of Nicos Kazantzakis, who is a very famous Greek writer, Turks are referred to as 'dogs'. (ibid)
- ...in the abusive uses of the term 'Turk' (meaning stupid) in Dutch (ibid), several dictionaries, such as the Woordenboek der Nederlandsche taal, also mention being 'dirty as a Turk,' 'looking like a Turk,' and 'being black like a Turk,' all referring to dirtiness.
- in the Italian warning to children who do not behave 'Mama, i turchi!', and in the abusive term marroquino,
- in the celebration of the defeat of the Muslims in the French croissant,
- or the Viennese kipferl,
- in the names of English pubs('The Turk's head)...(ibid)
- ...The Turk, he says, clings 'to his religion and his Koran: that will always endure, for the wily impostor who drew up the Mohammedan code so flattered the passions of his followers, that their allegiance was certain as long as human nature remained unchanging." Here again are the early conventions of Christian polemic: Muhammad as impostor, Islam as a creed that catered to the base senses. Even the traditional expectations that a Western reader entertains and usually find gratified in the East are not so in Smith's case. Instead, Smith perceives only plainness and ugliness.(Kabbani,1986;102)

Of Turkish women he has this to say: "Their complexions are pallid and unhealthy-looking, which may, in some measure, result from want of legitimate exercise; and they become prematurely aged. there is not, I imagine, a more perfect presentation of a witch to be found, than an old Turkish woman affords, when seen hobbling, with a long staff,a long the ding alleys of Constantinople". (Kabbani, 1986,102)
Turkey is a Muslim country. Europeans countries did not want to face the possibility of opening their borders to immigration from a country of 60 million Muslims and much unemployment."(Huntington,1997; 146)

In the following pages, I am going to discuss how the West stereotypes the Muslim character of Turkey and how this religion effected Turkey being 'othered'. Then I will discuss about the 'harem': the mysterious world. I will argue that harem is associated with Orient, thus Turkey with Orient. I will use the term Orient to refer to the 'othered' East, which is not Europe, which is the East when you look from Europe. There are more associations with Turkey and the Orient such as hamam, fez, bazaar and kebap. These are the symbols of the Eastern world, the Orient. After discussing all these we will have an idea about the pictures of Turkey in the West Europe: the pictures mixed with stereotypes and the pictures representing the 'Other'. However, these pictures will be clearer after the analysis of British Press about Turkey, which will be discussed in the third chapter. In the final chapter I will show the 'in-between country identity' of Turkey, which has internalised some of the stereotypes of itself and which came out from all these 'othering'. This identity is partly an outcome of the 'otherness', which finds its roots in 'uniqueness'.

Popular images of Turkey in the West have consistently played on the religious dimension, whether these images are produced in the media general or more scholarly texts in particular. (Travel agency images of sunny, historical, cheap Turkey in the West are an exception). On a political level, in the West Islam appears as a fundamental threat to liberty in the popular  

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2 The Islamic world was seen as Anti-Europe, and was held in suspicion as such. Christian Europe had entered a confrontation with the Islamic Orient that was cultural, religious, political and military, one that would decide from then on the very nature of the discourse between West and East. In the european narration of the orient, there was a deliberate stress on those qualities that made the East different from the West, exiled it into an irretrievable state of 'otherness'. Among the many themes that emerge from the European narration of the Other, two appear most strikingly. The first is the insistent claim that the East was a place of lascivious sensuality, and the second that it was a realm characterised by inherent violence. It was in the nineteenth century that they found their most deliberate expression, since that period saw a new confrontation between West and East - an imperial confrontation. If it could be suggested that Eastern peoples were slothful, preoccupied with sex, violent, and incapable of self-government, then the imperialist would feel himself justified in stepping in and ruling. (Kabbani,1986; 5,6)
consciousness. It is a threat to Turkey itself, and is also a threat to Europe's south-eastern Mediterranean seaboard. The threat of the Muslim has of course a long pedigree in the West. Muslims became 'a problem' for Europe right from the birth of Islam: a theological, intellectual, political and above all else cultural problem. (Stone; 35)

To many people living in the West, Islam is something, which still remains firmly 'outside' their immediate reality. As a collection of ideas mapping out a way of life, it appears to be spiritually as well as culturally alien to the beliefs, which they cherish or hold dear. The gulf, which separates them from Islam as a concept, let alone a religious system, is apparently profound and insurmountable. (Ansari, 2000;372)

In post-war democratic West Europe, in the period of the Cold War, anti-Islamic images of Turkey declined in the official media. Turkey, as an ally of the West, remained on the periphery of the fight against communism as far as European popular consciousness was concerned. In practice, it occupied a front line position. (Stone, 1996;36). Yet despite the recognition that stereotypes of Islam and Muslims have dubious roots, there has been growing tendency among some Western commentators to substitute Islam for communism as the new 'threat', based on the proposition of an essential clash of civilisations. In the new simplified map of the post-Cold War World, the colour for the West to beware is not the red of communism but the green of Islam, which writers, such as Lewis (1993) and Huntington (1993), have assumed represents the greatest contemporary threat to Western agency. For the West, Islam in the late twentieth century represents more than just a religious alternative to Christian values - to many Westerners, rightly or wrongly, it symbolises the major contemporary threat to their beliefs and ways of life. (Ansari, 2000;382)

"Islam has always represented a particular menace to the West. Of no other religion or cultural grouping can it be said so assertively as it is now said of Islam that it represents a threat to Western civilisation. It is no accident that the turbulence and the upheavals which are now taking place in the Muslim world (and which have more to do with social, economic, and historical factors than they do unilaterally with Islam) have exposed the limitations of simple-minded Orientalist cliches about fatalistic
Muslims without at the same time generating anything to put in their place except nostalgia for the old days, when European armies ruled almost entire Muslim world, from the Indian subcontinent right across to North Africa. The recent success of books, journals, and public figures that argue for a reoccupation of the Gulf region and justify the argument by referring to Islamic barbarism is part of this phenomenon." (Said, 1981)

Stereotyping and conflict between Islam and the largely Christian West have repeatedly fostered levels of ignorance, with the 1979 Iranian revolution, the Satanic Verses controversy and the 1991 Gulf War representing some of the more recent 'culprits' in this process. In the aftermath of the Satanic Verses and the war in the Gulf, Muslims in particular have been vilified as monsters who can never enter the contract of shared values.

"Distinct ethnic identities are to be protected, and even encouraged, but only within this framework of "a set of shared values". Difference is therefore acceptable as long as it does not lead to dissent, or the contestation of 'majority' values". (Bhattacharyya,1998;254)

The accentuated sense of the 'Other', which has been attached to Islam, on the one hand, emphasises the distinctions, which do exist between developments in many Muslim societies and trends towards secularisation in the West. On the other hand, however, it disguises the breadth of diversity and opinion, which can be found wherever there are Muslims. (Geertz, 1971)

"It is simply not true that Islamic societies cannot separate politics from religion. One can in fact argue an extreme case, namely that the whole history of Islam as a political and civilisational project has been dominated by realistic, political calculations. This, incidentally, was one of the arguments of The Satanic Verses. The lack of a unified Islamic polity for the last thirteen hundred years, and the different political uses to which Islamic authority is put, suggest that there is no one unifying politics to be derived from the holy texts. In the contemporary world, the example of a country like Turkey, once the leader of a supposedly Islamic empire, shows that there is no necessary relationship between a particular political and economic system, or indeed between religious sanction and the state, within the Islamic world." (Halliday,1995;118)

Gellner argues that Turkey is unique within the Muslim world, as secularisation has not occurred in the Islamic world, with one interesting
exception-Turkey. Although Turkey has chosen a secular path since 1920 and is quite different in terms of democracy, modernisation projects with Westernisation and Kemalist reforms, the Western world still draws attention to Turkey's Middle Eastern connections, when they want to prove that Turkey does not belong to Europe in terms of culture and way of life. In the Western eyes, it is the country, which has borders with Iran, -the land of Khomeini and Satanic Verses-, and with Iraq, -the land of Saddam and Gulf War-, so the image is: Why should Turkey, Muslim like Iran and Iraq, be different then these two countries?

It would not be a wrong argument to say that Turkey has been effected from the negative 'reputations' of Iran and Iraq. Since Iran has chosen with the 1979 Revolution an Islamic way of governing, law and way of life and Iraq which has practised Islamic socialism, are far from Turkey in terms of governments, secularism and even life-styles. In spite of all these differences Turkey has been put to the same box with these countries when it is needed to show that 'they are all the same fundamentalist, Third World countries, religious societies, which fight with each other continuously.'

2.1.2. THE MYSTERIOUS WORLD: 'HAREM'
The decadent Turk, epitomised by the corrupt, murderous and decadent Sultan with his secret harem, is an image of Turkey which until recently was a staple diet of Western representations of Turkey. The historical figure of the decadent, (especially sexually), Sultan dressed in his silks and 'turned up slippers' (beguiling for many, including Mozart) has for the most part now been divorced from your 'average Turk'. The considerable numbers of tourists who flock every year to the Topkapi Palace in Istanbul bear testament to the popularity of the Sultan/harem image. The image is worth exploring because

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3 I am not going to discuss whether these reputations of these countries are accurate or not. My point is only to show the differences between these countries and Turkey, as these countries made different decisions in many aspects, such as government, law, women rights and so on.
of its perceived relationship to Turkey, and if for nothing else to view what all the fuss is about. (Stone, 1998:36,37)

Stone maintains that until this day images of Turkey in the West have not escaped the Sultan/harem theme. Such a representation derives from the Western imperial presentation of the dark and corrupt oriental Turk. This image is periodically resurrected in the West with regard to perceived human rights violations in Turkey. On an intellectual level, this discourse is now shorn of the despicable oriental Turk. A great majority of tourists in Turkey are surprised to find how welcoming The Turk is. Thus the oriental Turk discourse has been, and is in decline. Still, the Sultan/harem image remains at a peak. (ibid; 37)

In a word, the harem symbolises the East -the mysterious orient. The signifiers -lust and death- are signified by the despotism of the orient. The harem moreover stands as a metaphor for a particular community: a corrupt community of cruelty and bestiality. It is a discourse, which closes off any semblance of Western notions of 'civilisation'. The harem is a way of talking about, communicating the difference between this part of the world and the West. (ibid,39)

"The very qualities that are seen as making Africa and the Orient so 'distant' can also render their strangeness fascinating, and it is this that constitutes them as 'exotic', objects that inspire both desire and fear. The Orient is 'mysterious'. Said refers to a cluster of notions that develop around the idea of the Orient, for instance its separateness, its eccentricity, its backwardness, its silent indifference, its feminine penetrability, its supine malleability. Other ideas that can be incorporated include its love of excess, in which the veneer of civilisation barely conceals eroticism and violence, and its unchanging timelessness." (Jervis, 1999:64,65)

The mystery of the Orient is characteristically presented as 'feminine'. The Orient is frequently veiled. As Joanna de Groot puts it:

"In the romantic travel literature it is the sight of veiled women which tells the voyager that he is in the Orient, just as their presence on the eastward voyage poses the first challenge to understanding. They are the image of what the 'Other' actually is, their veils and harems the symbol of that 'Other'." (ibid,65)
Although the 'harem' was only for 'Sultan' (king) and 'Sultans' remained in the 'Ottoman Empire' times (1299-1920), a great number of people in Europe and USA believe that an average Turkish man is allowed to marry more than one woman. Most of the Turkish students, when they go to study at the universities throughout Europe and USA have been asked, how many women a Turkish man is allowed to marry.

2.1.3 'TURKISH KEBAB IS NICE, TURKISH RAKI IS NICE'

Some More Associations with Turkey

"kebab-raki"

Every year, especially the Aegean Sea coasts and Mediterranean Sea coasts of Turkey have been visited by tourists from all over the world. The local people of these areas, e.g. restaurant owners, shopkeepers and etc., cannot avoid asking the tourists what they think about Turkey and if they are satisfied or not. Particularly, the ones who cannot speak English very well used to say: "Turkish kebab is nice, Turkish raki is nice, isn't it?" This expression and similar ones to this have remained in Turkish daily speech as 'funny' expressions towards tourists. Most of the comedians used this expression in their sketches. The communications between the 'Western' man and the 'local' Turkish man has become one of the funniest stories in the comedies. Most of the Turkish people laughed at themselves when the 'differences' between the local people and tourists was exaggerated by the comedians. They also realised that they were underlying 'the food' and 'the drink' when they are explaining the original things of their country. Is that the very 'internalising' what the others think about you?

We should also mention here the connection with Turkish migrants in West Europe and 'Doner Kebab', as this product developed through Turks' migration, especially in Germany. Ayse Caglar argues that nothing else is as often quoted as 'doner kebab' to refer to the positive effects of Turks' presence in Germany. Indeed it functions as a positive symbol in multiculturalist discourses, in contrast to the scarf worn by Turkish girls and women, which has become mainly a negative symbol in discourses concerning the lack of integration of German Turks.
"Embedded in the social relations and set of meanings surrounding it, doner became an integral part of Turkish migrants' relations with the Germans and of Turkish identities in Germany. In Germany and Berlin, doner kebab is strongly associated with Turks. It became the traditional ethnic food of Turks. In this way, it symbolises Turks and things thought to be Turkish. This strong association, almost an identity, is observable at different levels in a wide spectrum of practices ranging from children's books to official international evenings." (Caglar, 1995,221)

hamam, bazaar, fez

The hamam, or Turkish bath is many ways a religious experience. An Islamic adaptation of the Roman bath tradition, the hamam fulfilled the Koranic imperative of total ritual ablution while also providing an important social venue, especially for women who had few other opportunities to mingle independent of men. Visiting hamams today is not only an otherworld experience full of chance encourters with eccentric people and the occasional drag queen, it also informs a bridge between the bather and the time of Mimar Sinan and other Ottoman architects and Sultans. The hamam is symbolic of the spread of the Ottoman Empire. The Turkish baths in Budapest, for instance, serve as a reminder of the spread of the Ottoman Empire, as does the Turkish coffee sold in the cafes of Budapest. Turkish baths are now found in most of Western cities and bear testament to their enduring popularity as a form of cleansing imported from the Orient. Turkey, thus, with its innocuous Turkish baths involves a local 'neutral', discourse which is neither hostile, nor disrespectful, and inter-linked with other innocuous Turkish associations such as the Fez (brimless tasselled cap), Turkish delight and Kebab. The bazaar, also is an innocuous association with Turkey, except to say that it underwrites the Oriental difference (this time in terms of shopping) of Turkey. (Stone, 1998:40)

2.2. THE ROLE OF THE TURKISH MIGRANT WORKERS ON THE IMAGE OF 'TURK
"The idea that those who do not share the majority's culture are considered at best to be outsiders, at worst, a threat to the national policy, is anchored in laws and collective self-definitions. Media discourses representing foreigners negatively perpetuate and reinforce such stereotypes." (Breger, 1998; 13)

The symbolic polarisation between 'Us' and 'Them' is crucial in managing the ethnic consensus among the public at large. Rathzel notes that even the most sympathetic media discourses on foreigners tend to present them in terms of social problems, thereby immediately invoking the state's powers to interfere - to aid or to restrict - and thus in the process also reaffirming the power of the state. (Breger, 1998; 136) Not only in the media, but, especially in the everyday life, the minorities, who are supposed not to share the majority's culture are being excluded f. In his well-known book 'Modernity and Holocaust', Zygmunt Bauman mentions 'the solution to the Jewish problem' and refers to the conclusion of Ian Kershaw, which is:

"Where the Nazis were most successful was in the depersonalization of the Jews. The more the Jew was forced out of social life, the more he seemed to fit the stereotypes of a propaganda which intensified, paradoxically, its campaign against 'Jewry' the fewer actual Jews there were in Germany itself. Depersonalisation increased the already existent widespread indifference of German popular opinion and formed a vital stage between the archaic violence and the rationalised 'assembly line' annihilation of the death camps. The 'final solution' would not have been possible without the progressive steps to exclude the Jews from German society which took place in full view of the public, in their legal form met with widespread approval, and resulted in the depersonalisation and debasement of the figure of the Jew." (Bauman, 1989, 189)

Arnold Toynbee sees a parallelism in the situation of the Jews and the Turks in Europe. As he puts it:

4 Van Dijk maintains that the review of earlier studies showed that during the last decades the coverage of ethnic and racial affairs in the press, on both sides of the Atlantic, has gradually become less blatantly racist, but that stereotypes and the definition of minorities as a 'problem' or even as a 'threat' is still prevalent, in particular in the popular newspapers, while minority journalists, especially in Europe, continue to be discriminated against in hiring, promotion and news story assignments. The structure and style of headlines not only subjectively express what journalists or editors see as the major topics of news reports, but also tend to emphasize the negative role of ethnic minorities in such topics. Similarly, extensive analysis of the major subjects and topics showed that minorities continue to be associated with a restricted number of stereotypical topics, such as immigration problems, crime, violence (especially riots), and ethnic relations (especially discrimination), whereas other topics, such as those in the realm of politics, social affairs, and culture are under-reported. Moreover, as is the case for education, if such topics become prominent at all, then again problems and conflicts get most attention. (Van Dijk, 1991; 245)
"The Turks, like the Jews, have been, since they first made the contact with the West, a 'peculiar people'; and while this is an enviable position so long as you are 'top dog'...it becomes an intolerable humiliation as soon as roles are reversed...in both cases the status of 'peculiar people has ceased to be a source of pride and has become a source of humiliation; and in both cases, therefore, a strong movement has risen to escape from it." (Robins, 1996:64)

In Germany, the so called Gastarbeiter (guestworker) have been seen as a kind of continuation (this time by economic means) of the Ottoman onslaught on Europe. There is a sense of being overwhelmed by an alien culture.

"The Turks were simply identified with the enemy, which is to say the Jews, by means of a falsification which today, in the xenophobic attitudes towards the seasonal workers, runs the risk of becoming tragically true."(ibid;66)

I am not going to discuss this case of 'Jews and Turks' deeper. Yet my point will be the negative feelings and ideas towards the minorities. As I am writing about Turkey, the Turkish workers in Western Europe will be especially my interest. I said 'workers', because they constitute the largest group. I will try to show that the stereotype of 'Turk' in Western Europe was also shaped by the 'image of Turkish worker'. I will argue that these workers, most of them 'guest-workers' in Germany, are thought as typical Turks. Thus, there is a stereotype in these host countries, before they see Turkey or the rest of the Turks. I claim that they do not present the whole Turkey, nor they are typical of Turkey in general.

Some researchers have recently argued that our conceptions of groups are less 'abstract' then traditionally assumed, and that instead we rely heavily on our knowledge of specific group members and/or of particular experiences we have had with them. (Hamilton, Stroessner, Driscoll, 1994) When we look at to the 'Turkish' image in Western Europe, we realize that the Turkish migrant workers play a great role, as the people in host countries first see those workers as representatives of Turks. Their experiences are related mostly to those migrant workers.

On the other hand, there is ample evidence that stereotypes of nations reflect the prevailing political and economic relations between countries and that
changes in political alliances can result in dramatic shifts in stereotypic perceptions. Competition between groups for scarce economic and political resources was also believed to underlie many negative stereotypes. One study, for instance, documented the case of a small American community where anti-German stereotypes emerged as German immigrants moved to the town and competed with residents for jobs. (1994) Similarly, when the unemployment rates arose in Germany, there emerged anti-Turkish feelings because of the migrant workers in Germany. The Turkish workers have been accused to steal Germans jobs.

However, the migrant workers who went from Turkey to the West European countries have played and still play a very important role in the creation of the Turkish image in West. Although there has always been a migration of intellectuals and professionals to the Western world, the history of emigration from Turkey on economic grounds is quite recent. Turkey's involvement in large scale labour migration is mainly a post-Second World War phenomenon. Between 1961-73, Turkey was one of the largest suppliers of migrant workers to Europe. Through agreements signed with the Federal Republic of Germany, Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, France and Sweden a great number of people were recruited as 'guest workers' by various European employers. (Soysal, 1993;219)

Following the oil crisis of 1973, West European countries ended the guestworker programmes. However, the number of migrants from Turkey and from other labour exporting countries has continued to rise, through family reunion, asylum seeking, illegal migration, and natural birth. Despite increasing unemployment and the repatriation programmes, the West European governments have not been successful in sending their guest workers back. Today, foreign worker populations are permanent features of the European societies and economies, contrary to the official claims and original expectations. Migrants from Turkey, most of whom live in Germany, constitute the largest group among the foreign migrant populations in Europe, more than two million. (1993; 220)
Most of the studies on Turkish migration and guestworkers concentrate on the questions of how well migrants adjust or come to terms with the host society's culture and institutions. According to Soysal, these studies were in a monolithic form, which viewed migrant culture as homogeneous, undifferentiated, and static. She claims that the basic premise of such studies was the simple dichotomy of 'traditional' versus modern, the clash between the cultural backgrounds of migrants and the norms and structures of the European systems. She argues that 'integration' posits and necessitates a process through which migrants adopt 'modern' norms and participate in the values of the host society; they thus become better adjusted and more satisfied individuals.

"...what appeared to be an expression of radical dissent boiled down, after all, to the shifting of emphasis from the individual to social needs, whether predicated on individuals or on groups: the need of social integration. Any moral system is destined to serve the continuous existence, and the preservation of the identity, of the society which supports its binding force through socialisation and punitive sanctions. The persistence of society is attained and sustained by the imposition of constraints upon natural(a-social, pre-social) predilections of society members: by forcing them to act in a way that does not contradict the need to maintain social unity."(Bauman, 1989; 172)

If we see 'integration' as adapting 'Western life' and participating 'European values', we cannot claim that the Turkish workers were fully integrated to the 'European kind of life'. The first generation workers who went to Europe were people not even from the urban places of Turkey. Most of them were from small villages and they were the less qualified workers who could not find job back in Turkey. So it is not something highly expectable from them to adapt easily to the urban life, as they did not have such an experience even in their own countries. On the other hand some of them rejected the idea to be adapted. There were people who have lived in those host countries for years and they even did not change the traditional man trousers called "salvar", which is only to be seen in the villages of Turkey. The relatives of some workers, for example their wives or parents did not show an effort to learn the language of the host country.
This was the one part of the story, yet, the crucial point is this question: "Should these people change their clothes or adapt the new values?" Since we are in the age of multiculturalism, and as the logic behind it is that we owe equal respect to all cultures (Taylor, 1994:68), we have to think again to what extent we tolerate the 'Others'. I tried to look at the idea of 'integration' from the perspective of the repressive ones who see integration in the ways of dressing and sharing the same values, yet the ideal would be, of course, the recognition of the 'Other's' cultures.

Keith Cameron argues that the more a minority feels threatened by the political majority or by a more powerful economic power, the more it will tend to assert its own culture and language. (Cameron, 1999; 2) Similarly, the minority will try and protect its culture from outside influences by not learning the language of the other in favour of its own. Whatever the reason is for some who are not willing to be adopted to the host country, the important point for us here is the image of the average Turk in Western Europe as this image effected the general image of Turks. It is not very difficult to try to describe this image: 'a man with dark hair and moustache, wearing peculiar clothes and eats Doner Kebap" and "a woman with headscarf, shy and ruled by her husband'. As Akkent puts it: '

'When people talk about Turkish women who have migrated, they concentrate on differences, such as the headscarf, and look upon them as beings outside any historical development, as slaves of tradition. When for example a 'Turkish girl' is mentioned, everyone knows for a fact that they are 'locked up at home', that they are 'virgins when they marry', and that they cannot attend school because they must look after their younger brothers and sisters. This stereotyping of girls or young women from Turkey means that if they dress differently from the way people expect them to, if they do not wear a headscarf, have blue eyes or interesting job, they are described as 'non typical' or 'already integrated'. It seems almost impossible for a Turkish woman to define herself in a way that does not correspond to a stereotype."(Akkent, 1998:vii)

'Concentrating on differences' is the most outstanding part of Akkent's argument, which brings us to 'Self/Other' discussion. It is said that the concept of collective Self is necessarily linked to that of collective Other in what Gamson and Modigliani called 'sets of interpretive packages' within the broad discourse. Intrinsic to this is evaluation of both 'Self' and 'Other' within changing socio-economic contexts.
"Where Other's differences to Self are emphasized, instead of similarities, Other is constructed as alien, positively as a mirror of what Self has lost, or negatively as a threat. The most dangerous construction of Other is as the 'enemy within' the state, which constructs groups of resident foreigners stereotypically and racially as, at best, a social problem, at worst a national threat." (Breger, 1998;136)

When collective definitions of 'Self' or 'Other' tend to concentrate on the differences between groups, they thereby necessarily ignore or play down any similarities. This sort of focus thus helps maintain the idea that ethnic groups generally have little in common with each other, by focusing on cultural items, such as dress, beliefs, rituals, food - all of which of course do change in time-making these seem to be of great importance in defining groups. This of course then neglects issues like how access to resources is controlled, both within and without the group, as well as neglecting the power relationships between an ethnic group, other ethnic groups, and the majority culture. (1998). The tolerance to other cultures is connected with the notion of multiculturalism, which we are going to discuss in the final part of the dissertation.
CHAPTER 3

AN OVERVIEW OF THE REPRESENTATIONS OF TURKEY IN THE
BRITISH PRESS (1999)

"The 'content' of newspapers is not facts about the world, but in a very
general sense 'ideas'."

"The language is not neutral, but a highly constructive mediator."

(Fowler, 1991)

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3.1.METHODOLOGY AND LITERATURE

It is not very surprising that the term 'stereotype' was introduced not by a
behavioral scientist but by a journalist: Walter Lippmann. As I mentioned
earlier, Lippmann was struck by the way different observers could 'see' the
same event in dramatically different ways and he realised the role of
preconceptions, with his terms: 'the pictures in our heads'.

"A stereotype is a socially-constructed mental pigeon-hole into which
events and individuals can be sorted, thereby making such events and
individuals comprehensible: 'mother', 'patriot', 'business-man', 'neighbor',
on the one hand, versus 'hooligan', 'terrorist', 'foreigner', on the other.
It is of fundamental importance to realize that stereotypes are 'creative':
they are categories, which we project on the world in order to make sense of it. We construct the world in this way. And our relationship with
newspapers makes a major contribution to this process of construction." (Fowler, 1991; 17)

Yet the only reason to see things differently is not innocently the preconceptions in our minds. There are also reasons to show things differently, because of political, ideological or economical interests, beliefs, ideas and so on. As Fairclough argues, that journalists do not only recount events, they also interpret and explain them, try to get people to see things and act in certain ways, and aim to entertain. (Fairclough, 1995; 91)

Norman Fairclough warns us by claiming that it is important to be aware that what we read in a newspaper or see on the television screen is not a simple and transparent representation of the world, but the outcome of specific professional practices and techniques, which could be and can be quite different with quite different results. He argues that a basic assumption is that media texts do not merely 'mirror realities' as is sometimes naively assumed; they constitute versions of reality in ways which depend on the social positions and interests and objectives of those who produce them. They do so through choices which are made at various levels in the process of producing texts. The analysis of representational processes in a text, therefore, comes down to an account of what choices are made- what is included and what is excluded, what is made explicit or left implicit, what is foregrounded and what is backgrounded, what is thematized and what is unthematized, what process types and categories are drawn upon to represent events, and so on. (Fairclough, 1995; 103, 204) It is important to analyse media texts, not only because they are not innocent, transparent representations of the world, and also because of their power:

"The power of media to shape governments and parties, to transform the suffering of the South (rooted in exploitation by the North) into the entertainment of the North, to beam the popular culture of North America and Western Europe into Indian agricultural communities which still depend on bullock-power. The power to influence knowledge, beliefs, values, social relations, social identities. A signifying power (the power to represent things in particular ways) which is largely a matter of how language is used." (Fairclough, 1995;2)
Since the media is so powerful to create, to shape and to transform the ideas and beliefs and since the stereotypes are also to be found in media, it seemed to me very important to look at the media. To understand the image of Turkey, the representations of Turkey (as ‘Other’) in Western European media and the usage of the stereotypes about Turkey, I decided to analyse newspapers. As it was quite difficult to look at the texts from different European countries, I have chosen Britain for my analysis. I attempted to see the images of and associations with Turkey through the news-reports headlines, the languages they use, the topics they chose and the subjects they select. I have used the ‘British National Newspapers Index’ in the Library of the University of Essex in order to find the news reports written about Turkey. Since the latest year in the archive of the computer was the year 1999, I decided to examine the headlines and topics of that year. For my analysis I have chosen two quality newspapers: 1) the Guardian, as representative of liberal, left-of-centre of the British Press, 2) the Times, as representative of conservative, right-of-centre and one popular newspaper the Daily Mail.

Content analysis was conducted about the Turkish image in the British press, by looking at ‘the words used in the headlines’, ‘the topics of the articles’, ‘the subjects’ and ‘the attitudes towards Turkey displayed in the articles’. Discourse analysis is also used for the recurrent themes, as well as the way in which they are presented.

3.2. HEADLINES:
I will begin my analysis of news reports about Turkey in British Press where such reports begin themselves: ‘the headline’. Headlines in the Press have important textual and cognitive functions. Thus, they deserve special attention. As each of us knows, they are the most conspicuous part of a news report, since they are brief and in bold type. Their main function is to summarise the most important information of the report. That is they express its main ‘topic’, a notion I will discuss in the following pages. Grammatically headlines are often incomplete sentences: articles or auxiliary verbs may be deleted. This may sometimes lead to vagueness or ambiguity, which may
also have a special ideological function, for instance when the responsibility for an action must be concealed. (van Dijk, 1991;50) A good example for this case could be shown from the Guardian headline:

"AND AS FOR THE KURDS?" (15.04.99)

or from the Times:

"NO PEACE, EVEN FOR THE DEAD"(18.11.99)

Van Dijk maintains that the headlines also have an important cognitive function: they are usually read first and the information expressed in the headline is strategically used by the reader during the process of understanding in order to construct the overall meaning, or the main topics, of the rest of the text before the text itself is even read. Indeed, often readers do not read more than the headline of a news report. Headline information is also used to activate the relevant knowledge in memory the reader needs to understand the news report. Thus, as soon as the word 'riot' is used in the headline, the reader will activate relevant general knowledge about riots, that is, a so-called 'riot script'. This script monitors the interpretation of the details of the rest of the text. Most importantly, headline information signals the reader how to 'define' the situation or the event. This 'top-level' information of the text will therefore often serve as the top level of the mental model the readers build of that event. (van Dijk, 1991; 51) This means, then, the newspapers readers in Britain will define the situations and events in Turkey with the words: death, die, war, terror, kill, disaster, rebel, fight, attack, arrest and suicide, since there is a great number of headlines containing these words. You can see it in the table 1, where I put the most frequent words in the headlines of three newspapers.

"Deadly, dangerous...these details generate a sense of alarm, underlined by the reporters delivery which stresses the words deadly, dangerous. It is sensationalist. It also helps to build up a negative, critical view" (Fairclough, 1995; 4,5)

Headlines often have ideological implications. Since they express the most important information about a news event, they may bias the understanding process: they summarise what, according to the journalist, is the most
important aspect, and such a summary necessarily implies an opinion or a specific perspective on the events. Therefore, journalists may 'upgrade' a less important topic by expressing it in the headline, thereby 'downgrading' the importance of the main topic. Shortly, headlines are a subjective definition of the situation, which influences the interpretation made by readers. (van Dijk, 1991; 51) Defining an event as a 'fight' may lead to a different interpretation of the news report, and hence to a different model of the situation, from when the event is defined as a 'struggle' or a 'quarrel'.

"SECULARISTS AND ISLAMIST FIGHT FOR MODERN TURKEY"(16.04.99-Guardian)

In the example above, the reader may have the idea first that these two groups are fighting with each other. Yet, the real meaning is far from that, which is that these groups try to have modern Turkey, thus, they work for this aim. The following examples are also similar, because there are a lot possibilities to explain these events, but the words like fight or kill are preferred.

"ARMY FIGHTS BACK ON QUAKE BLAME"(06.09.99-Times)

*TRADE RETHINK COULD KILL SUPPORT FOR TURKISH DAM (02-08-99Guardian)

I examined the 'headlines' of news reports about Turkey, published in 1999, taken from The Times (124), the Guardian (124), and the Daily Mail (25). The frequency of the news reports about Turkey was at the peak in August in all these newspapers, since the 'earthquake in Duzce' occurred in August. The Times published 59, the Guardian 39 and the Daily Mail 8 news reports about Turkey in August. One obvious explanation for this is that catastrophically negative events score high on most criteria to choose subjects so receive massive newspaper coverage. (Fowler,1991;13)

The first property of the headlines we examine is the use of words, that is, their lexical style. Words manifest the underlying semantic concepts used in
the definition of the situation. Lexicalisation of semantic content, however, is never neutral: the choice of one word rather than another to express more or less the same meaning, or denote the same referent, may signal the opinions, emotions, or social position of a speaker. Not only do they express the definition of the situation, but they also signal the social or political opinions of the newspaper about the events. It is not that the headlines define or summarise events, they also evaluate it. Hence, the lexical style of headlines has ideological implications.

There are also headlines which are very easy to be misunderstood at the first glance. They may not have written intentionally yet still they do not try to prevent to be misunderstood. A good example for that is:

"SLOW, HELPLESS AND DISORGANISED- TURKS ACCUSE THEIR LEADERS" (23-08-99, the Guardian)

When you first read it, you read like 'slow, helpless and disorganised Turks' accuse their leaders.

A similar example to this is:

"WHERE IS THE ARMY, ASK QUAKE SURVIVORS" (21-08-99 the Times)
It is like to be referred to the survivors, yet there is a sense of agreement of the journalist with the survivors about blaming the army.

Yet the headlines related with the Britain are written in a different style. As van Dijk argues, negative acts of in-group members (here British), such as the authority may be reduced in effect by passive sentences. (1991;215) The following headline is about the decision of funding the dam in Turkey by Britain:

"BRITAIN IS WARNED NOT TO FUND TURKISH DAM" (08-05-99The Guardian)

Since I have followed the newspapers on this issue, I have seen that the dam project turned to a problem and there were numbers of reports in the newspapers on this dam project, implicitly or explicitly against to fund. If this headline would be in 'active', the whole discourse would be changed. Now, as
the sentence is passive, we have the thought that Britain actually wants to fund, but it has been warned not to fund.

On the other hand, when Britain has a positive role, as in the headline:

"BRITISH JOIN RESCUE TEAMS FLOCKING TO AID VICTIMS STILL TRAPPED UNDER RUBBLE " (19-08-99 the Times)

they are put in prominent first position.

However, in order to see the how the headlines show the events related with Turkey, generally, the table below will help us. My conclusion of this analysis is that Turkey has a dark, chaotic face with conflicts and fights.

**Table 1. Most frequent words in the 'headlines' about Turkey of three British newspapers, 1999**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Word</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Word</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Earth-quake</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>disaster</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>death/die/dead</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>victim</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurd/(s)/(ish)</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>war</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rescue/(er)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>suicide</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dam</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Islam/(ist)</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kill/(s)/(er)</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>head(dress)/(scarf)</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>warn</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>tremor</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>survivor</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>rubble</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rebel</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>attack</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>army/military</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>terror</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fear</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>poll/s</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>prison/(er)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>buried</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bomb/(ing)/(er)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>anger</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>toll</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>arrest</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earth-quake</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>death/die/dead</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurd/(s)/(ish)</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rescue/(er)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dam</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kill/(s)/(er)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>warn</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>survivor</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rebel</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>army/military</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fear</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>prison/(er)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bomb/(ing)/(er)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>toll</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**3.3. TOPICS**

Topics are an important aspect of news reports and they reflect many dimensions of the psychology and sociology of the news. They represent what news-makers construe to be the most important information about a news event. The selection and textual prominence of topics result from routines of news-making and embody criteria of journalistic decisions about the newsworthiness of events. Therefore, topics also manifest complex networks of professional, social and cultural ideologies. They are crucial in cognitive information processing, and allow readers to better organise, store
and recall textual information in memory. Experimental research has shown that topics are usually the best recalled information of a text. (van Dijk, 1991;71,73)

Unlike topics in everyday storytelling, topics in news reports are usually not expressed in a continuous way. It is not the chronology of the events, but rather, their importance, relevance and newsworthiness that organise news reports. For my analysis of news reports, it should be stressed that the formation of topics is subjective: what for one journalist or reader is the most relevant or important information of a text, may not be so for others. Similarly, different readers may also give at least slightly different summaries of the same news story. This means that the headlines and leads of the newspapers are not objective summaries of the report, but necessarily biased by specific beliefs, attitudes, and ideologies. Furthermore, topics expressed in headlines may be seen as subjective 'definitions of the situation'.

Now we will look at three topics from three newspapers, which took place on the same day:

**STAY OUT OF TURKEY REBELS TELL TOURISTS**

*By Barbara Davies (16-03-99)  
The Daily Mail*

British tourists were last night told to keep away from Turkey by terrorists rebels.

The warning came from the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK), which is responsible for the bombing campaign currently sweeping the country. It was delivered just hours before a bomb ripped through the Turkish capital, Ankara. In a statement, the rebels told British travel agents to cancel reservations and not take any more bookings from holidaymakers, 'so as not to open the way to any unfortunate incident.'

'All of Turkey has become a field of war.' It said. 'This includes the areas seen by the Turkish republic as areas of tourism. Last night the Foreign Office said it would be reviewing its advice to Britons travelling to Turkey and warned that their safety could not be guaranteed.
KURDISH REBELS WARN TOURISTS TO KEEP OUT OF TURKEY

By Andrew Finkel In Istanbul And Michael Binyon (16-03-99)
The Times

KURDISH rebels attacked Turkey's £5 billion tourist industry yesterday by warning foreigners to keep out of the country.

"All Turkey is a battlefield, including those areas designated for tourism," a statement issued for the armed wing of the Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK) through the German-based DEM agency said. The statement, referring to the capture last month of Abdullah Ocalan, the PKK leader, accused America, Israel and "some European countries" of engaging in terrorism and piracy. It added: "It is essential that no tourist comes to Turkey, that governments warn their citizens and that travel companies cancel reservations."

The Foreign Office was holding talks with the British Embassy in Ankara yesterday to see whether it should advise tourists not to visit Turkey. Diplomats were also talking to travel firms about the warning.

Terror warning to tourists

The Guardian 16 03 1999.

Chris Morris in Ankara, Ian Traynor in Bonn and Will Woodward

British and German visitors to Turkey in danger as Kurdish militants declare war on holiday industry.

Millions of British and European holidaymakers were told to steer clear of Turkey's Mediterranean resorts yesterday after Kurdish militant followers of the imprisoned guerrilla chief, Abdullah Ocalan, declared war on the Turkish tourist industry. The statement from Ocalan's PKK or Kurdish Workers Party followed bombings in Ankara and Istanbul over recent days in which 14 people were killed. The attacks were blamed on the PKK.

Released in the name of the "headquarters of the People's Liberation Army of Kurdistan", the statement said: "Every area of Turkey is a war zone, including those areas designated tourist areas by the Turkish state." The British and German governments said they took the PKK threat seriously and the Foreign Office which yesterday changed its travel advice twice said there could be no guarantees of safety. Although the latest advice falls well short of urging Britons not to travel to Turkey, it says terrorist attacks in tourist areas "cannot be ruled out."
There is a similarity between the headlines used for this news-report. Both the Times and the Daily Mail use the word 'rebel' and the phrases 'Stay out of Turkey' and 'Keep out of Turkey'. The Guardian prefers the word 'terror', whereas it shares the word 'warn (ing)' with the Times. Yet the difference of Guardian from the others is that it does not mention Turkey in the headline.

There is an informal, conversational way of expressing in the language of the Daily Mail. It does not mention the source of statements or after an expression: 'All Turkey has become a field of war'' it does not mention who said this sentence. You only read: 'It said'. But you do not know who made this statement. On the other hand, the Times prefers using 'All Turkey is battlefield', and it gives the information where these comes from. Actually, with or without giving information of the sources, they are both too exaggerated, big claims and based on terrorist groups words rather than governments or institutions statements. That all Turkey has become a field of war' or 'all Turkey is battlefield' are from being facts, anyway.

"There are always alternative ways of wording any (aspect of a) social practice, that alternative wordings may correspond to different categorisations, and that such alternative wordings and categorisations often realize different discourses." (Fairclough, 1991:114)

Three months later of these reports, we see in the Daily Mail an article: "When is a holiday not a holiday". This article is on the 'Travel Mail' page and it is about the holiday resorts of Turkey with introducing the best places to visit and to see. It is written impartially and in a nice, entertaining way. The country which was a field of war, becomes almost a paradise in couple of months, there is nothing about the terror or war:

DAILY MAIL
05-06-99
By Neil Murray

"when is a holiday not a holiday? When you are accompanied by teenage girls. For the knowledge that you are heading to the sun with
two young women who want to go clubbing every night is bound to fill even the most easy-going parent with trepidation. After Majorca last year- our first family holiday where a curfew was a major bone of contention- the thought of going through it all again in Turkey made me apprehensive.

...As the holiday resort in Turkey, Marmaris is not short of things to do or see. With the temperatures around 38 to 40c, we were glad of the air-conditioning in the impressive, five star Grand Azur Hotel. Set in well-maintained gardens, it was an oasis of peace in the madness that is Marmaris...Cruising round bays, dropping anchor and dipping into the sea for swim, eating and drinking as much as you want..."

These two news about Turkey in the Daily Mail shows the 'contradictionary' images of Turkey. Once you read that you should cancel your reservations if you head for Turkey, then, in less than three months time, exactly in the holiday-time, you read how nice is having a vacation in Turkey. At the end, the Daily Mail, even only in terms of holiday, shows some good news about Turkey, something from life, society, entertainment, whereas in Guardian, there is almost no good news about Turkey, at least in 1999. In the coming page, I will discuss this in terms of the 'subjects' reported in these three newspapers during the year 1999.

3.4. SUBJECTS

A subject is a single concept, such as 'crime' or 'education', which stands for a large social or political domain or a complex issue about which the Press offers potentially an infinite number of specific news reports. I have analysed the overall 'subject' categories of the reports about Turkey according to the British national newspapers index in the library of the University of Essex. All the reports about Turkey were categorised according to their themes. I analysed which subjects (themes) were reported most frequently by each of these newspapers and which themes were reported least frequently. Before I start, I want to draw attention to the research of the Glasgow University Media Group and the University of Birmingham Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies. On this model, news is socially constructed:

"What events are reported is not a reflection of the intrinsic importance of those events, but reveals the operation of a complex and artificial set of
criteria for selection. Then, the news that has been thus selected is subject to processes of transformation as it is encoded for publication; the technical properties of the medium-television or newsprint, for example- and the ways in which they are used, are strongly effective in this transformation. Both 'selection' and 'transformation' are guided by reference, generally unconscious, to ideas and beliefs." (Fowler, 1991:2)

Since I have seen that there is a tendency in the newspapers to report particular kinds of events and to publish articles in particular themes more frequently, I realised that the 'selection' of the events and themes play a very crucial role in the discourses.

As an example, in the Guardian, apart from the reports written about the earthquake (39), there remained 85 articles. 26 of these articles were directly related to the Kurdish issues and PKK, and 10 other articles, which have been categorised under the subject of electricity, were about Kurdish issues again. As a result, we can say that 42 % of the articles were about the 'ethnic conflicts'(!) in Turkey. If we categorise the articles about tourism, archeology, social life and environment in one group, we see in the Guardian only 5% of the articles written about this group of subjects. 20% of the Times' subjects, apart from the ones about earthquake, are about the Kurds. 26 % are about football and 12 % are about the group of subjects (travel, archeology, social life, environment). In the Daily Mail, 23% of the articles were about Kurds, 15% about football and 23% about tourism. In the 'Social Construction of News', Fowler argues:

"Real events are subject to conventional processes of selection: they are not intrinsically newsworthy, but only become 'news' when selected for inclusion in news reports. The vast majority of events are not mentioned, and so selection immediately gives us a partial view of the world. Selection is accompanied by transformation, differential treatment in presentation according to numerous political, economic and social factors."(Fowler, 1991;11)

The selection of the news can change the view we see the world. Imagine a country which finds place in the press most of the times with 'ethnic conflicts' and generally 'negatively reported politics and government subjects'.

"media power is especially prominent in ethnic affairs because of the fact that large segments of the white public have a little or no alternative information sources on ethnic affairs. moreover, even everyday conversations on ethnic affairs are largely dependent on media
While examining the reports related with the Kurds issue, I have realised the 'Kurds', which is one of the ethnic groups in Turkey (not the only one) and the PKK have been used by the British Press most of the times interchangeably. Yet there is a danger to use these interchangeably. The PKK, from the starting point may be a Kurdish Workers Party, but, as the Times has put it in the article example above, there exist an armed wing of the party, which is actually a terrorist organisation. On the other hand, Kurds are a big ethnic group, and not all of them support this party and its terrorist actions. It is extremely dangerous to think that the PKK represents all the Kurds. There is a great number of Kurds who reproach the way of PKK uses. Such headlines like, "And as for the Kurds?"(15-04-99, the Guardian) or "Kurds are ready to take revenge"(30-06-99, the Times) may be extremely offensive for some of the Kurds, since they do not approve the PKK. It is a generalisation like to claim that all the Irish support IRA. And of course, some may argue that kind of headlines are provocative as well.

"The media emphasize that serious ethnic conflict is especially prevalent 'elsewhere', for example in Bosnia, Somalia, India or Rwanda. Without denying these tragedies, we may also point our that, interestingly, this special media emphasis itself is a prominent feature of 'ingroup' discourse: they create more(serious) problems than we do. The 'western' press even imply (though it will seldom say so explicitly) that their 'ethnic strife' or 'tribal wars' are backward and primitive, while at the same time denying or mitigating our (and its own) stereotypes and racism."(van Dijk, Ting-Toomey, Smitherman, Troutman, 1997; 145)

After I finished to read the articles in the Guardian, I had a feeling that nothing good happens in Turkey. As an example there is no report about the Salvador Dali Exhibition is taking place in Turkey, but it becomes an event when a person punches through the glass protecting one of the Dali's paintings.

Guardian, 24-08-99

Dali paintings attacked

A man punched through the glass protecting a pair of Portraits by the Spanish surrealist painter Salvador Dali At an exhibition in Istanbul leaving blood stains on the works,
Turkish newspapers said yesterday. The man was reported to have been angered by the Nudity Dalí's portraits of Leonardo da Vinci and Michaelangelo.

This is a well-constructed discourse, which shows the backwardness of Turkey. It gives the image, that Turkish people attack paintings, because they show nude people. If the newspaper would report let us say one day before this 'event' that Dalí's paintings are in Turkey, people would make 'modern' associations with Turkey. on the other hand, one of the Turkey's most selling newspapers 'Milliyet' reported this event on the same day under the headline of 'Vandalism'. Milliyet has drawn attention to this man's psychological illnesses and it is told that he was someone who is continuing to a mental treatment in a psychiatry clinic. There was no connection with 'nudity' in that report. I also guess in the article of the Guardian, there is an implicit way of referring to Islam and Islamic society, as the religion does not appreciate nudity.

However, it seems to me that the Guardian is not likely to report events like social life, culture, arts, sports or environment. If you read this newspaper, you could develop an image of Turkey with 'fights', 'ethnic conflicts', 'radically Muslim' and 'violent in human rights'. The Times, on the other hand gives more place than Guardian to the subjects like football or social life. The Daily Mail seems mostly interested in holiday and traveling subjects. Of course, it is also important the differences between these newspapers. We cannot expect the same from a quality newspaper and a tabloid. The selections of the subjects are to be seen more clearly in the following table:
Table 2. 'Subjects' in the news-reports about Turkey in three British newspapers:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>The Guardian</th>
<th>The Times</th>
<th>The Daily Mail</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Earthquake</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurds/PKK</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politics-government</td>
<td>9(general)+</td>
<td>7(general)+</td>
<td>7(general)+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7(Islam)</td>
<td>5(Islam)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electricity(dam)</td>
<td>10(Kurds)+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10(general)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Football</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relations with other countries</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU(relation, Membership)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Travel&amp;tourism</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murder</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prisons/(ers)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic situation and policy</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drug</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenians</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Press</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Archeology</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
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CHAPTER 4

SEARCHING FOR AN 'IDENTITY' in the 'NEW WORLD ORDER'

So far we have seen the 'stereotyping' and 'othering', how Turkey was stereotyped and represented as 'other' in the West European perspectives and the images and associations of Turkey. Then we have looked at the British newspapers in order to see these images deeper and have a clearer idea. We realised that there are strong associations with Turkey and East, a fear about its Muslim character, the stereotyped image of the Turkish worker and represented in the media as a country with ethnic conflicts and human rights violations. I want to refer now all these representations as non-western associations of Turkey and with its exclusion of Europe. Yet it is only one part of the story. The exclusion from Europe does not refer to the full inclusion to the Islamic world, Middle East, Asia or Orient. There seems to be an ambivalence where Turkey stands, belongs to, or categorised as. Now I will try to show this ambivalence and uniqueness of Turkey in terms of identity.

Samuel Huntington, when he writes about 'the cultural reconfiguration of global politics' claims that, spurred by the modernisation, global politics is being reconfigured along cultural lines. Peoples and countries with similar cultures are coming together while people and countries with different cultures are coming apart. He says that alignments defined by ideology and superpower relations are giving way to alignments defined by culture and civilisation. Political boundaries increasingly are redrawn to coincide with cultural ones: ethnic, religious, and civilisational. (Huntington, 1996; 125)

It is no more possible for a country to be non-aligned or to change its alignment from one side to another, as it was possible during the Cold War. The times, when the leaders of a country could make these choices in terms of the security interests, of the balance of power, and of their ideological preferences are over. In the New World, however, cultural identity is the central factor shaping a country's associations and antagonisms. While a country could avoid Cold War alignment, it cannot lack an identity. The
question is now "who are you?" rather than "which side are you on?" So every state has to have an answer. That answer, its cultural identity, defines the state's place in world politics, its friends, and its enemies. (ibid)

Huntington claims that the 1990s have seen the eruption of a global identity crisis. Almost everywhere one looks, people have been asking, "who are we?" "Where do we belong?" According to Giddens, globalisation is altering many other aspects of national politics and nation-state power too. He sees the 'European Union' as a response to globalisation - an attempt to compensate for the declining power of the nation-state by building a supranational association of European states. (Giddens, 1997; 352).

Cameron argues in her book 'National Identity', that one of the big issues in creating the European Union is to get people to feel a sense of loyalty to this grouping of diverse states and nations. She puts it:

"As individuals we support our local and regional sporting teams when they play against those of neighbouring localities and regions within our own state and yet when a team, which in the national context we may have opposed, finds itself in the position of representing the state we tend, to transfer our allegiance to it. In a competition between a European team and ones from other parts of the globe, would we be inclined, irrespective of our ethnic origins, to identify with the Europeans? If this is the case, it suggests that national identity is often not a fixed concept but one of which the definition can vary according to the circumstances. The symbols of our identity change according to our concept of what constitutes the 'nation'." (Cameron, 1999; 4)

Yet the EU is not the only example, there are other groupings all over the world, such as NAFTA (North American Free Trade Assignment), ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations), Mercosur and so on. These organisations are, characteristically, 'single' civilisational. The European Union as an example, is the product of a common European culture. Huntington strongly believes that 'single civilisation' organisations, such as EU (European and Christian-till now-.) are much more successful than the 'multi-civilisational' ones. He shows this with the example of CARICOM (Caribbean Community):

"The single civilisational CARICOM, composed of thirteen English-speaking former British colonies, has created an extensive variety of cooperative arrangements, with more intensive co-operation among some sub-groupings. Efforts to create broader Caribbean organisations bridging
the Anglo-Hispanic fault line in the Caribbean have, however consistently failed. Similarly, the South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation, including seven Hindu, Muslim, and Buddhist states has been almost ineffectual, even to the point of not being able to hold meetings." (Huntington, 1996; 131)

The point is then, the relation between the culture and economic co-operation. Most of the countries, whatever, if it is as a response to globalisation or not, are willing to be a member of those economic co-operations and while they are choosing their partners, they tend to choose the culturally closed ones. Yet what about the countries, who are culturally not homogeneous and who have sizeable groups of people from different civilisations? Are they going to 'feel' alone and excluded from the rest of the world, because they cannot prove an identity, which is acceptable by the others? Let alone the 'outsider' countries, but what about the countries, which are already members of those co-operations and organisations? Are they 'satisfied' with their 'unified' identities? To quote Cameron:

"As the European Union becomes more unified through its legislation and interstatal trade and movement, there is a centrifugal movement in a number of Member States as individuals begin to feel threatened and to think that they are losing their national identity". (Cameron, 1999; 1)

On the one hand, there are countries, -with 'clear' and 'acceptable' identities, 'belonging' somewhere in the world-, complaining about losing their 'national identities'; on the other hand, there are countries who try to define their 'identities' and make it acceptable in order to be in one of those groups. Turkey may be the best example to the latter ones. It is a country, which does not belong any of those organisations in the world except NATO, which is a military organisation, rather than an economic or cultural one. Turkey attempted several times to be a member of the European Union yet still could not be successful in this aim. At this point, I remember the very question of Cameron: "Is national identity something of which we ourselves are aware or is it an identity which others bestow upon us?" I would say: "both!"

**TO BE OR NOT TO BE 'EUROPEAN'**
Ernest Gellner sees Turkey as a 'unique' case. According to him, this uniqueness is found in at least four fields: in religion, in state formation, in the pattern of nationalism, and in the diverse styles of modernity. He sees the history of modern Turkey as a successful transformation of the 'Ottoman Empire', which had been characterised by a spirit of cosmopolitanism; by ethnic, linguistic and religious mixture and interchange, into a secular and modern republic.

As Gellner, Huntington, and some writers, sociologists, and social scientists put it: Turkey is a unique case. It is a unique case in its geographical location, in its history, in terms of its religion and secularism, in its so-called 'ambivalent' identity or say, 'torn country' features, and more. Whether it is its reflection or not, these uniqueness is to be found in 'Other's eyes. According to European Union and to some Europeans Turkey does not belong to Europe. According to Islamic World, Turkey is not 'Islamic' enough, as it has chosen a secular way and turned its face to Europe. Where does Turkey belong?

Turkey is neighboured with Greece in the West, Russia in the North, Iran, Iraq, Syria in the East and Mediterranean Sea in the South. Starting with its geographical point, it is a unique case. It is the country, which connects the two continents: Europe and Asia. The biggest city of Turkey, Istanbul, is divided with a bridge into Europe and Asia. Historically, Turkey was home to a variety of civilisations, since 7000 B.C. From the ancient civilisations: the Hittites, the Urartians, the Lydians to the Romans, the Byzantine, the Seljuk and Ottoman Empires, Turkey was in all its history the place where different cultures, civilisations, religions, languages and ethnic groups have met. It is a land with monasteries, tombs of local saints, mosques, churches and palaces all together. The land is Mediterranean, Middle Eastern, European, Ottoman, Roman, Byzantine, Anatolian and modern Turkish at the same time.

"In its hybridity, -its particular kind of hybridity- it still does not conform to European standards. Those who outrightly oppose Turkish membership have more fundamental grounds for objection. They draw attention to Turkey's Middle-Eastern and Islamic connections."(Robins, 1996; 66)
Robins also quotes Lord Owen's words:

"You have to have clarity about where the boundaries of Europe are, and the boundaries of Europe are not on the Turkish-Iran border." (ibid)

Yet the only obstacle on the way to Europe is not the border with Iran, there is more:

"It was Genghis Khan's need for tough mercenaries that brought the Turks from their ancient homelands of central Asia to the shores of the Mediterranean." (Robins, 1996:66)

According to these perspectives, it is the Turk, uncertain or alien, who is the problematical element in the encounter- the only problematical element. Arnold J. Toynbee wrote in 1925, that the Turks sought to be admitted as full members of Western society in order to escape from the terrible position of being its pariahs. Kevin Robins argues that the Turks, in certain respects have succeeded in establishing their credentials as a westernised and modernised society. The problematic for him is that among Europeans, there has the sense remained that Turkey is not authentically of the West; the sense that it is alien, an outsider, an interloper in the European community. As Zafer Senocak puts it, there is the belief that 'a Turk reads the Koran, he doesn't go to the opera'. In European eyes, Turks remain a 'peculiar people'. (Robins, 1996; 65)

On the same issue, Metin Heper argues that Turkey's credentials as a Western country have always been controversial. He draws attention to a British Foreign Office despatch's words in 1856: "Now that Turkey is to become an integral part of the European system". On the other hand, Heper says, for many Westerners, the stereotype of 'the Terrible Turk' never lost its salience.

"This ambiguous attitude towards the Turks was perhaps best expressed when in the nineteenth century the Ottoman empire was referred to as 'the sick man of Europe' - 'of Europe' but sick." (Heper, 1993;1)

It is worth to quote Heper here again:
"It seems that the state of the Turkish economy will no longer pose too great an obstacle for Turkey's integration with the European Community in the years to come, though in the eyes of many Europeans, the free circulation of Turks may. For it is thought that the Turks do not share European culture and would not fit into the community. Here foremost in the minds of many Europeans is the idea that because the Turks are Muslims their values, attitudes and behaviour patterns would be unsuited to smooth absorption into the Community". (1993;4)

A similar, yet, more radical view, -not surprisingly- comes from Samuel Huntington:

"The late twentieth-century leaders of Turkey have followed in the Ataturk tradition and defined Turkey as a modern, secular, Western nation state. They allied Turkey with the West in NATO and in the Gulf War; they applied for membership in the European Community. At the same time, however, elements in Turkish society have supported an Islamic revival and have argued that Turkey is basically a Middle Eastern Muslim society. In addition, while the elite of Turkey has defined Turkey as a Western society, the elite of the West refuses to accept Turkey as such. Turkey will not become a member of the European Community, and the real reason, as President Ozal said, "is that we are Muslim and they are Christian and they don't say that." Having rejected Mecca, and then being rejected by Brussels, where does Turkey look?" (1993;42)

According to Huntington, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk had created a new Turkey out of the ruins of the Ottoman Empire, and had launched a massive effort both to westernise it and modernise it. He claims that in embarking on this course, and rejecting the Islamic past, Ataturk made Turkey a 'torn country', a society which was Muslim in its religion, heritage, customs, and institutions but with a ruling elite determined to make it modern, Western, and at one with the West. (1993;74) What Huntington names as 'elements in Turkish society', which have supported an Islamic revival, is recent phenomenon, and related with the rejection of Brussels. From my point of view, it was a reaction to be rejected by Europe. It was a response to Europe like: "If you do not accept us
into your group, because we are Muslim..." and, then, either implicitly or explicitly, "We become more Muslim". The rejection by Brussels has been seen also as a failure of the politicians in the government. So, by the next elections people have reacted to the parties like ANAP (central right, liberal), DYP (central right, conservative) and DSP (central left) and supported the fundamentalist party 'Refah'.

The feeling of rejection is kind of 'othering'. The 'othered' groups start to develop counter stereotypes and to underline their rejected features. Yet there is still the 'desire' to be accepted by the one who rejected. We can even see it from the slogans of Turkish football team supporters. When a Turkish team wins a cup in Europe or beats a 'European' team, the supporters start to shout: "Europe, Europe listen, this is our voice, these are the steps of the Turk". The Turk knows that he is not European, because he was rejected, but he still wants to make his voice to be heard, which means he wants to be accepted. From the time that he shouts "Europe, Europe", he shows that he had internalised his 'othered' character. The desire to be accepted is similar to what Fanon illustrates about the black people's desire to be white.

"By loving me she proves that I am worthy of white love...
I marry white culture, white beauty, white whiteness. When my restless hands Caress those white breasts, they grasp white civilisation and dignity and make them mine."(Fanon, 1967;63)

Frantz Fanon used psychoanalytic theory in his explanation of racism, argued that much racial stereotyping and violence arose from the refusal of the white 'Other' to give recognition from the 'place of the other', to the black person. (Hall, 1997;238) He demonstrated how black people saw their own image in relation to how others saw them. He has illustrated how the colors black and white have come to symbolise the racism and how this had a negative effect on black self-esteem, ultimately leading to a desire to be white.

If we adopt Fanon's theory 'desire to be white' to the 'desire to be accepted as European', still we can not claim it for the whole Turkey. There are certain differences between the countryside and urban areas of Turkey. The big cities, especially the ones on the West coasts may be developed or even has
reached 'European' standards, but the 'Other' Turkey, which is economically, socially and culturally 'backwards', should not be forgotten. On the one hand, there are people with high living standards and opportunities, on the other hand there are people who are unemployed, or less paid, needs to be educated properly and so on. These people have their basic needs first, thus they are not very much interested in 'European' kind of life or identity, whatever. The biggest problem to talk about Turkey is because of its very heterogeneous features and diverse characteristics. If the accurate word is multicultural, it is multicultural. Or if it is the ambivalent identity, it is ambivalent. Yet all these, are the outcome of the history, geography, religion, politics, the civilisations which lived there and so on. For the Christian West, it is the country, with the scarf on the head, for the Muslim world, it is the country, which put off the scarf from the head.

According to Huntington, Turkey is the most obvious and prototypical 'torn' country. 'Torn countries', according to him, are the ones, which have a fair degree of cultural homogeneity but are divided over whether their society belongs to one civilisation or another. These are 'torn countries'. Their leaders typically wish to pursue a bandwagoning strategy and to make their countries members of the West, but the history, culture and traditions of their countries are non-western, argues Huntington. At least, Huntington does not leave Turkey without any advises and recommends to the Turks, to look to Tashkent (Uzbekistan):

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5 Huntington defines different countries with different names like: lone countries, cleft countries or torn countries. A lone country for him is the one which lacks cultural commonality with other societies, he gives Ethiopia as an example. A cleft country is the one where large groups belong to different civilisations. India, Sri Lanka and Malaysia are defined as cleft countries by him. Huntington claims: 'In a cleft country major groups from two or more civilisations say, in effect 'We are different peoples and belong different places'. The forces of repulsion drive them apart and they gravitate toward civilisational magnets in other societies. A torn country, in contrast, has a single predominant culture which places it one civilisation but its leaders want to shift it to another civilisation. Unlike the people of cleft countries, the people of torn countries agree on who they are but disagree on which civilisation is properly their civilisation. Typically, a significant proportion of the leaders embrace a Kemalist (derived from Kemal Ataturk) strategy and decide their society should reject its non-Western culture and institutions, should join the West, and should both modernise and Westernise. Turkey, is of course, the classic torn country which since the 1920s has been trying to modernise, to Westernise, and become a part of the West. Mustafa Kemal Ataturk had a created a new Turkey out of the ruins of the Ottoman empire, and had launched a massive effort both to Westernise it and modernise it. in embarking on this course, and rejecting the Islamic past, Ataturk made Turkey 'a torn country, a society which was Muslim in its religion, heritage, customs, and institutions but with a ruling elite determined to make it modern, Western, and at one with the West.'(Huntington, 1996; 74, 138)
"The end of the Soviet Union gives Turkey the opportunity to become the leader of a revived Turkic civilization involving seven countries from the borders of Greece to those of China. Encouraged by the West, Turkey is making strenuous efforts to carve out this new identity for itself." (ibid)

The 'identity' of Turkey is highly likely one of the most important obstacles for its relations with the rest of the world. Although the Turkish former presidents Turgut Ozal and Suleyman Demirel say: "We are Europeans. We would like to stay as Europeans. We share the values of European civilisation in addition to our own values." Europe is not persuaded, however. Those who are more sympathetic to the Turkish petition will put forward the argument that Turkey has not yet become sufficiently western to be accepted, or that it has not thoroughly resolved its identity crisis in favour of westernisation. What is invoked is the 'uncertainty of identity' within Turkey: "There appears to be some considerable doubt even among Turks of similar socio-economic background as to the exact nature of the country and its people". (Robins, 1996:65)

It is very important how we see the world and how we define and name the situations. If we insist on that Turkey has an 'ambivalent' identity, that it is 'unique', 'peculiar', 'non-Western', 'non-European', 'Muslim but secular', full with contradictions and so on, we do not come up with positive views. We see these characteristics as problems or obstacles of Turkey. The ideal would be to see Turkey without stereotypes, without 'Othering' as a unique case, but arguing that it is multi-cultural. Charles Taylor, who is the writer of 'The Politics of Recognition', identifies a normative conception: the discourse on multiculturalism is about stipulating the procedural and substantive principles ordering a multicultural society. He argues that a number of strands in contemporary politics turn on the need, sometimes the demand, for recognition. The demand comes to the fore on behalf of multiculturalism.

"The thesis is that our identity is partly shaped by recognition or its absence, often by the misrecognition of others, and so a person or group of people can suffer real damage, real distortion, if the people or society around them mirror back to them a confining or demeaning or
CONTINUATION
The ethnic and cultural diversity of societies is reflected in language, discourse and communication. Members of different groups routinely speak with, or about, 'Other'. Of course, each group has its own values, norms, beliefs, language, as well as ways of speaking. Yet in order to understand each other and be able to work together people tend to mutually adapt themselves, more or less, to the others. They often learn each other's language and about each other's special habits and up to a point accept and respect each other's cultural identities. (Van Dijk, Toomey, Smitherman, Troutman, 1997;144) This is the good part of the story. Yet the question is: "Is the story always like that in the real world?"

Multiculturalism, mutual respect and tolerance between different ethnic or 'racial' groups is merely an ideal. In the real world, however, cultural
misunderstanding, ethnic conflict, prejudice, xenophobia, ethnocentrism, and racism frequently characterise relations between groups that are somehow 'different' from each other. This is especially the case when one group holds more power, has more privileges or more resources and uses the 'difference' as a legitimation to dominate or marginalise others. It is not surprising, therefore, that the standard disclaimer just mentioned ('We have nothing against X...') is usually followed by but, introducing something negative we say about them. This shows that ethnic or 'racial' inequality is also evident in the way 'we' speak and write to (or about) the others. Indeed discourse is a prominent way in which ethnic prejudices and racism are reproduced in society. (ibid)

In this dissertation I tried to uncover Turkey as the 'Other'. Yet because the very notion of 'Other' depends on from which part you look, I have to make clear that I tried to look at Turkey from the West. I aimed to highlight the images of Turkey in Western eyes, particularly in Western European. That brought me to follow the way of representations of 'Other', i.e. representations of Turkey in 'West'. Since I have realised that the 'images of the 'Other' are shaped with the inevitable contribution of 'stereotypes', I started my way with examining stereotypes. I attempted to highlight the need to stereotype, the dangers of stereotypes and most importantly, how they are brought to encounter with the 'other'. I discussed these subjects in my first chapter and my conclusion of this chapter is that, since stereotypes are exaggerated beliefs, associated with a category, and their function is to justify our conduct in relation to that category, it is very difficult to see our world without stereotypes. This is the very point of stereotypes, is that we know the world before we experience it. However, stereotypes would be seen as innocent 'pictures in our heads', which help us to deal with the events in our everyday lives, if they would not be so close to prejudices. Yet they may be dangerous in our relationships with the 'others', as they are so close to prejudices.

On the other hand, stereotypes are not to be changed easily, since our mind tends to approve them. So, they may stay with us for years and even for centuries, as our children born to our societies, to our beliefs and values. Yet
it does not mean that they will stay always the same. I believe that stereotypes may change, but, I do not believe that we will ever live in a world without stereotypes, since there always will be the 'Other'. The only thing what we could do, would be, to clean our stereotypes from the dust of prejudices. If we believe in a multicultural world, we really need to do that. Yet the clock, always, would turn back in a dramatic way and we may end up with monoculturalism. However, the ideal would be, of course, the 'sincerely' multicultured world, which means for me 'to be multicultural', not, 'to have to be multicultural'.

From my point of view Turkey is a multicultural country, not because of the political needs to be multicultural, but, because of its very characteristics. The interesting point is Turkey cannot enjoy its multicultural nature, since the 'others' tend to categorise the countries within homogenous (!) groups, which belong together in terms of their culture, religion and so on. The ideal of being multicultural does not seem as an advantage when the subject is Turkey. On contrary, Turkey has been excluded from Europe, partly because of its multicultural characteristics were not interpreted in a positive way, but, in a confusing and negative way. In the second chapter I tried to show the most common images of Turkey, which are strongly stereotypic as well, and I also drew attention to the image of Turkish worker, since the Turkish worker was seen as an average Turk and was generalised. Then, in the third chapter, in order to make the discussion about the images broader, I analysed three newspapers from the British Press. This helped me to see the picture of Turkey and the Turk in a larger frame.

My conclusion of these chapters is that these representations are strongly effected by stereotypes and the intention to consider Turkey without 'othering' and freed from stereotypes is least likely. These representations were drawing attentions to the country's Muslim characteristics, to its Middle-Eastern connections, to its 'developing country' features and its problems with PKK were showed in a wrong direction. The outcome was similar to Huntington's expressions: "Turkey is too poor, too populous, too Muslim, too harsh, too culturally different, too everything."(Huntington,1998; 146) At the end, Turkey was too 'othered'.
All these brought me in my final chapter to the identity of Turkey, which is effected and shaped by partly by these images, stereotypes and representations. Of course, Turkey internalised this 'othering'. Of course, the identity of Turkey is not only internalising what the 'Other' think of it, on the contrary, Turkey has 'bridge-country' characteristics, if we prefer to define it like that. Yet the very problem is how to interpret and describe Turkey more accurately. This will be my interest for the rest of my life.

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